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The People's Republic ofChina (PRC) has undertaken extensive military modernization
efforts in the post-Cold War period. Many ofthese efforts are directed at curbing what the
Chinese consider unchecked US influence in the Asia-Pacific region. Continuing efforts by
the United States to develop and deploy ballistic missile defenses (BMD) threaten to
undermine the PRC's sole overseas power projection instrument, ballistic missiles, leaving
Beijing with a seriously weakened repertoire for coercion and undermining Beijing's long-
term goal of acquiring the ability to counter US influence. This thesis examines China's
national security interests in the near future and the ballistic missile defense capabilities being
pursued by the United States. It then analyzes the implications of the potential competition
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Efforts by the United States to develop and deploy ballistic missile defenses (BMD)
threaten to undermine the sole overseas power projection instrument of the People's Republic
ofChina (PRC), leaving Beijing with a seriously weakened repertoire for coercion. This thesis
examines the ballistic missile defense capabilities being pursued by the United States and
assesses their implications for Sino-American security relations. In light of Beijing's post-
Cold War international perceptions and national security concerns, what role do the Chinese
assign to ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons in their national security? How might the
PRC adjust its national security strategy to respond to US BMD capabilities and how would
those adjustments affect US security interests in Asia?
To answer these questions this thesis examines three topics: first, the perspective
from which Beijing approaches international relations, the foundation of the PRC's national
security strategy, and the role ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons have in this strategy;
second, the United States ballistic missile defense effort and its probable future; and third, the
implications of effective US BMD capabilities for Chinese security policies.
The thesis concludes that Chinese strategic culture can sufficiently explain current
Chinese security concerns and actions; that Beijing's nuclear security ambitions are not
"outside the box" of normal international behavior; and that despite some US fears of
Chinese regional hegemony, the evidence is lacking to suggest that China will be a
destabilizing force for regional security. Serious economic and political cohesion troubles
within the PRC will not diminish in the near term. Consequently, US action to counter a
xi
regional Chinese security threat by containment or confrontation is premature. While such
possibilities should not be ruled out, a cautious vigilance regarding Chinese political-military
behavior and efforts to engage China and to foster a stronger regional security dialogue are
more appropriate. Despite recent growth rates, China's economic prospects are precarious.
For this reason and others, the United States and China have a common interest in promoting
regional stability.
China is already addressing future US BMD capabilities while shaping its national
security strategies for the next century. Beijing apparently aims to curb US influence through
area denial strategies. Beijing plans to combine missiles and blue water naval forces to inject
uncertainty into US intervention calculations. US ballistic missile defenses would challenge
China's area denial strategy by potentially negating China's short and medium range ballistic
missiles.
The implications ofUS BMD for China's nuclear deterrent are secondary to those US
BMD would have for Chinese conventional power projection capabilities. China has,
however, manifested a growing sensitivity toward the international climate on nuclear issues.
China is modernizing its nuclear forces to close the qualitative gap between China and the
West. China would prefer to avoid international arms control efforts, but increasingly must
take them into account in its overall national security strategy, lest it find itself ostracized.
China's actions demonstrate that, despite its declaratory policy, it is trying to limit the extent
of its involvement in arms control.
It is not apparent that China wants conflict with the United States. It is in US interests
to reassure Chinese leaders, both politically and militarily, particularly on the bilateral level.
xii
The Chinese are seeking the ability to counter what they consider unchecked US regional
power. At least for the time being, however, the Chinese do not want the United States to
remove its political-military presence from the region. A reduced US political-military
presence would invite Japan to build up its military, a greater long-term concern for Chinese
national interests than US influence in the region. China's interest in maintaining constructive
economic and political relations with the United States offers the United States an opportunity
to pursue its decisions about missile defenses in East Asia in a cautious and deliberate manner,




In the summer of 1995 and the spring of 1996, the People's Republic of China (PRC)
conducted missile tests in the Taiwan Strait using DF-15/M-9 short range ballistic missiles,
one ofChina's newer ballistic missiles. Despite questions surrounding the dual capability of
the DF-15, the uncertainty sent an implicit nuclear threat to Taiwan that was strangely out of
place in the post-Cold War era, strong even by superpower standards during the Cold War,
"and unprecedented on China's part." 1 The 1996 crisis emphasized the PRC's missile
capabilities and revealed glaring weaknesses in the other aspects of the PRC's defense
establishment, particularly in power projection. The PRC's lack of blue water naval capability
effectively inhibits overseas power projection in the traditional sense — ships, long-range
attack aircraft, and the ability to insert land forces beyond its borders. Overseas military
coercion for the PRC is effectively limited to missile threats.
Efforts by the United States to develop and deploy ballistic missile defenses (BMD)
threaten to undermine the sole overseas power projection strong point of the PRC, leaving
Beijing with a seriously weakened repertoire for coercion. This thesis examines the ballistic
missile defense capabilities being pursued by the United States and assesses their implications
for Sino-American relations.
1
Richard D. Fisher Jr., "China's Missiles Over the Taiwan Strait: A Political and Military
Assessment," in Crisis in the Taiwan Strait, James R. Lilley and Chuck Downs, eds. (Washington, DC.
National Defense University Press, 1997), 167-168.
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JA. RESEARCH QUESTION AND HYPOTHESIS
In light of Beijing's post-Cold War international perceptions and national security
concerns, what role do they assign to ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons in Chinese
national security? How might the PRC adjust its national security strategy to respond to US
BMD capabilities and how would those adjustments affect US security interests in Asia? In
the last ten years, the United States, Russia, Britain, and France all quantitatively reduced
their nuclear stockpiles. Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan, born into the nuclear club
following the Soviet Union's breakup, eventually gave up all nuclear weapons capabilities.
South Africa also willingly gave up its indigenous nuclear weapon capability. In contrast, the
PRC has resisted the global nuclear trend in the post-Cold War era, keeping its nuclear
armament levels constant while working to improve the capabilities of current forces. 2
Nuclear weapons remain a key component of PRC aspirations for great power status.
Ballistic missiles are key power projection components of China's military forces. While its
economic and conventional force potentials remain great, substantial time is needed for
developing these potentials before either economic or conventional forces could alone support
PRC status as a great power. In the interim, nuclear weapons help to fill the existing gap
between Beijing's aspirations and its capabilities.
If the United States continues its research and development efforts and eventually
deploys advanced BMD capabilities, what consequences might arise with the PRC? United
2
Robert S. Norris, Andrew S. Burrows, and Richard W. Fieldhouse, Nuclear Weapons
Databook, Volume V: British, French, and Chinese Nuclear Weapons (Boulder, CO: Westview Press,
1994), 8-10; additionally used were the yearbooks published by the Stockholm International Peace
Research Institute, SIPR1 Yearbook: WorldArmaments and Disarmament, (New York: Oxford
University Press); published annually, 1991-1997.
States BMD capabilities could erode China's ballistic missile capabilities, undermine this
nuclear factor and place the PRC in a position of significantly reduced international status.
In this respect, Alastair Iain Johnston's research has revealed a troubling tendency in China's
behavior. As China's international stature and power have grown since 1949, the likelihood
ofthe PRC becoming involved in militarized disputes has not gone up, as some foreign critics
ofChina presume. Inauspiciously, however, those disputes in which it has become involved
included predominantly threats to China's territorial integrity or international stature and
escalated to higher levels offorce quickly?
The argument here is not that because of a traditional Chinese strategic culture, the
PRC is (or will) remain benign beyond its borders. 4 Instead, the argument is that Chinese
strategic culture can sufficiently explain current Chinese security concerns and actions; that
Beijing's nuclear security ambitions are not "outside the box" of normal international
behavior; and that despite some US fears of Chinese regional hegemony, the evidence is
lacking to suggest that China will be a destabilizing force for regional security. Serious
economic and political cohesion troubles within the PRC will not diminish in the near term.
Consequently, US action to counter a regional Chinese security threat by containment or
confrontation is premature. While such possibilities should not be ruled out, a cautious
vigilance regarding Chinese political-military behavior and efforts to engage China and foster
a stronger regional security dialogue are more appropriate. Despite recent growth rates,
3
Alastair Iain Johnston, "China's Militarized Interstate Dispute Behavior 1949-1992: A First
Cut at the Data," The China Quarterly (March 1998), 1-30.
4 Yan Xuetong, "China's Post-Cold War Security Strategy," Contemporary International
Relations 5, No. 5 (May 1995), 6-7; cited in Denny Roy, "The 'China Threat' Issue: Major Arguments,'
Asian Survey 36, No. 8 (August 1996), 763.
China's economic prospects are precarious. For this reason and others, the United States and
China have a common interest in promoting regional stability.
B. SCOPE
Finding the answers to these questions requires three steps: first, understanding the
perspective from which Beijing approaches international relations, the foundation of the
PRC's national security strategy, and the role ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons have in
this strategy; second, understanding what comprises the United States missile defense effort
and its probable future; and third, an assessment of the implications US BMD would have on
Chinese security to determine what consequences may be in store for the Asia-Pacific region
and Sino-American relations. The first requirement— understanding Beijing's perspective
— invites a broad array of issues and influencing factors to the research. Not all can or
should be pursued thoroughly in this work, and some will be only briefly mentioned. The
intent is not to define in detail Beijing's international relations outlook, but to provide
sufficient background to proceed with the BMD assessment.
C RELEVANCE
In the post-Cold War era, an economic boom swept the Asia-Pacific region. During
this boom, the PRC's economy grew at an average annual rate of 9 percent, and despite the
region's current economic turmoil, China's economy remains relatively strong. 5 Benefitting
China s economic expansion began in 1979 when Deng Xiaoping initiated economic reforms.
Gerald Segal and Richard H. Yang, eds., Chinese Economic Reform: The Impact on Security (New
York: Routledge, 1996), 4. "China" and "Chinese" throughout this thesis refer to the PRC and its
citizens. When needed, the terms "Taiwan" and "Taiwanese" will be used for the Republic of China and
its citizens. When referring to the ethnic Chinese population beyond these two political entities, the
phrase, "ethnic Chinese" will be used in conjunction with any specific state (e.g.. ethnic Chinese in
Singapore).
from China's economic success, the budget of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) also has
grown. Combined, China's post-Cold War economic and military growth has fueled concern
about its regional (and global) intentions and ambitions. Official Chinese figures put the
PRC's military budget at US $9.7 billion in 1997, up from US $7.6 billion in 1995 and US
$8.6 billion in 1996. Inflation also grew at 17 percent and 8 percent in these years
respectively, meaning official budget figures barely maintained pace with inflation. These
official PRC figures fall short ofactual military expenditures by not including military research
and development, foreign military equipment purchases, direct subsidies to Chinese military
industries, and funding for the People's Armed Police (PAP). Additional income generated
by PLA earnings from commercial activities and PLA-run farms bring estimates to a more
realistic but less precise range ofUS $28 billion to US $50 billion. 6
Chinese economic success fuels not only regional, but also global speculation that
early in the twenty-first century the PRC "may become the world's largest economy as well
as the largest market."
7
If current economic trends in China continue, the PRC will likely
become the most influential economic and military power in East Asia within the next decade.
Amicable relations with China might then be deemed essential, given US regional national
interests. It would make little sense for the United States to pursue near-term missile defense
policies that would in a longer term undermine US national security. Examining the
6 SIPRJ Yearbook 1994, 441-448; SIPRI Yearbook 1997, 197; International Institute for
Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 1997/98 (London: Oxford University Press, 1997), 176. James
R. Lilley and Chuck Downs, "Introduction: Crisis in the Taiwan Strait," in Crisis in the Taiwan Strait,
edited by James R. Lilley and Chuck Downs (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press,
1997), 4.
Institute for National Strategic Studies, 1998 Strategic Assessment: Engaging Powerfor
Peace (Washington, D. C: National Defense University, 1998), 37.
implications that US BMD capabilities might present for Sino-American relations may be
useful in identifying potential policy conflicts and possible remedies. Answering the question
ofwhy ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons remain so important in Chinese national security
strategy is particularly relevant to the regional security calculus and thus to the United States,
which has significant regional economic stakes and security commitments. Of the various
means available to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the Central Military Committee
(CMC) for ensuring national security, nuclear weapons constitute one of the instruments most
poorly understood by foreign analysts. As a major power, China is also adapting ballistic
missiles to a broader strategy than Western states. The United States might inadvertently
complicate its own security challenges because of the unexpected and undesired effects
resulting from pursuing and acquiring capabilities such as advanced theater and national
ballistic missile defenses.
D. METHODOLOGY
This thesis uses a strategic cultural case study approach to examine Chinese
international relations. International relations theories alone are insufficient for grasping the
importance of ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons in Chinese national security. Strategic
culture provides what generic international relations theories do not: the unique details that
cannot be ignored in efforts to understand state actions. Jack Snyder characterizes strategic
culture as "the sum total of ideas, conditioned emotional responses, and patterns of habitual
behavior that members of a national strategic community have acquired through instruction
or imitation and share with each other." 8 The intent of this thesis is not to devise a broadly
generic cultural theory from which to assess Chinese strategic culture, nor is it to apply a
broad generic cultural theory to the Chinese case. The strategic culture approach, combined
with the case study methodology, is necessary because Chinese cultural characteristics
influence Beijing's perceptions ofthe international community, and China's experiences have
shaped these cultural characteristics.
E. ORGANIZATION
This thesis has three main sections, presented in Chapters H through IV. Chapter II
investigates Chinese national security, emphasizing foreign relations and security policies as
they relate to Chinese national security objectives. This chapter provides an answer to what
drives China's national security strategy and why certain issues receive priority in its national
security calculus. The questions ofwhat makes nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles vital
to Chinese security, and ofwhy the Chinese are concerned about US missile defenses are left
to Chapter IV.
Chapter HI examines US ballistic missile defense programs. The primary focus is on
theater missile defenses (TMD) vice national missile defenses due to the relative success and
greater probability ofnear-term deployment, although national missile defense (NMD) is also
briefly examined. Prospective BMD hardware capabilities as well as probable deployment
postures are examined.
Jack Snyder, The Soviet Strategic Culture: Implicationsfor Limited Nuclear Operations,
RAND Report [R-2154-AF] (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1977); cited by Michael C. Desch, "Culture
Clash: Assessing the Importance of Ideas in Security Studies," International Security 23, No. 1 (Summer
1998), 152.
Chapter IV assesses Chinese concerns about US ballistic missile defenses and the
potential impact of the United States missile defense programs on China's national security,
particularly the roles ballistic missiles play and how they could be affected. Costs and benefits
are examined. The cost of US missile defenses to Sino-American relations could be
significant, but the United States might choose to pay the price in order to be able to respond
to non-Chinese missile threats (and to be able to deal with Chinese missile threats to Japan,
Taiwan, and South Korea) despite potential consequences involving Sino-American relations.
Chapter V summarizes the findings, highlighting those aspects of ballistic missiles and
nuclear weapons in Chinese national security, as well as US missile defense concerns, which
threaten trouble for bilateral relations and those aspects which may favor constructive bilateral
cooperation.
H. INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN CHINA
Scholars in the West continue to discuss which international relations theory best
describes the international environment. Whether a particular theory accurately does so is not
the issue here. Rather, the issue is what theory explains how the PRC perceives states'
behavior in the current international environment. Is it possible that Chinese leaders
consistently shape their decisions and actions such that an existing theory describes their
behavior? Structural patterns in the PRC's security policy contain deeply rooted cultural
characteristics based on Chinese history. These patterns are seen not only in China's security
behavior, but in its larger international relations behavior. Realism explains the Chinese
leadership's perceptions of the international environment, while complex interdependence is
also needed to sufficiently explain their resultant national security behavior. Nuclear weapons
play a significant role both in Chinese perceptions of the international environment and in
Chinese behavior, particularly regarding the major political powers.
A. BEIJING'S PERCEPTION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
Beijing's perception of the international environment is a Realpolitik one. This
perspective, however, is slowly yielding to the influence of complex interdependence theory,
especially economic interdependence, while Beijing continues in its general disdain for
Western liberal political philosophies. The use of these two concepts, Realpolitik and
economic interdependence, is not contradictory. It shows the bias of the PRC leadership in
conceptualizing the international environment in realist terms and acting with realist




Chinese international perceptions and national security behavior are fundamentally
Realpolitik. The limited acceptance of economic interdependence that has occurred results
from a cautious recognition of the theory's benefits that supercede the PRC's past
international self-isolation. Beijing's Realpolitik perceptions have not significantly eroded
under this economic interdependence influence, nor does it appear that a shift to a
fundamental non-Realpolitik perspective is imminent. 9
Realism argues that relations among states can be explained by each state's desires to
acquire power that guarantees state security. There are three assumptions that accompany
this perspective. First, realism assumes states are unitary actors and dominant in world
politics. Second, realism assumes that force is "a usable and effective instrument of policy."
And third, realists have a "hierarchy of issues in world politics, headed by questions of
military security: 'high politics' of military security dominates the 'low politics' of economic
and social affairs." 10 For realists:
Each state attempts to defend its territory and interests from real or perceived threats.
Political integration among states is slight and lasts only as long as it serves the
national interests ofthe most powerful states. Transnational actors either do not exist
or are politically unimportant. Only the adept exercise of force or the threat of force
See Alastair Iain Johnston, Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in
Chinese History (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995); Alastair Iain Johnston, "China's New
'Old Thinking': The Concept of Limited Deterrence," International Security 20, No. 3 (Winter 1995/96),
5-42; Alastair Iain Johnston, "Prospects for Chinese Nuclear Force Modernization: Limited Deterrence
Versus Multilateral Anns Control," The China Quarterly, (June 1996), 548-576; Alastair Iain Johnston,
"Cultural Realism and Strategy in Maoist China," in The Culture ofNational Security: Norms and
Identity in World Politics, Peter J. Katzenstein, ed., (New York: Columbia, 1996), 216-268: Johnston,
"China's Militarized Interstate Dispute Behavior"; Yong Deng, "The Chinese Conception of National
Interests in International Relations," The China Quarterly (June 1998), 308-329.
10
Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Power and Interdependence: World Politics in
Transition (New York: Little, Brown, 1977), 24.
10
permits states to survive, and only while statesmen succeed in adjusting their
interests, as in a well-functioning balance of power, is the system stable. 11
Realism alone does not sufficiently explain the specific manifestations of China's
behavior. While realism explains China's general perceptions and behavior, Chinese culture
is required to understand the specifics of China's security decisions. One notable exception
is that China deviates from the traditional realist hierarchy of military and economic power.
Traditional realists emphasize military power (or security) and marginalize economics,
whereas Chinese realists emphasize that military power derives from a state's economic
power.
12
This is what allows economic interdependence to encroach on Chinese Realpolitik.
In current debates surrounding a post-Cold War Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA), the
recurring theme is that the civilian sector is bringing the changes on the military sector, a
reversal ofhistorical patterns. The Chinese are believers in this relationship, recognizing that
"to the extent that the revolution proceeds from forces in the civilian world, the potential will
exist for new military powers to emerge extremely rapidly " 13 Economic power enables
military power. China's growing economic power reflects a potential to more quickly
translate civilian technologies into military capability. As such, China's military power, the
fulcrum of its Realpolitik outlook and its national security strategies, hinges on continuing
China's economic success.
China subscribes to realism's state-centric notion, including the condition of anarchy
that undergirds the need for power to ensure its security. Chinese perceptions of the world
11
Ibid.
12 Yong Deng, 314.
13
Eliot A. Cohen, "A Revolution in Military Affairs," Foreign Affairs, (March-April 1996), 51.
11
portrays it as almost exclusively an arena of states engaged in merciless competitions. 14 States
jostle to achieve their own national objectives using political pressure backed by economic
and military strength, a recurring concept throughout the twentieth century. The imposition
ofWestern colonialism on much of Africa, South Asia, and Southeast Asia in the preceding
three centuries persuaded Chinese leaders that nothing less than national survival was at stake
in a Darwinian struggle among states. 15 This geopolitical perspective is summed up as: "A
state must have space to breathe, grow, and expand. . . . Strong states must develop their own
complete economic base, including the defense economy, so that they will not be dependent
on any other state." 16
Accompanying this state-centric approach is the domestic-international dichotomy
often found in realism. The domestic realm is solely the responsibility of the individual state
while the international realm allows states to conduct power politics and achieve gains that
14
Western international relations theory works remain heavily censored in China. However,
works by Western realists (either structural or classical) are being increasingly translated and published
with government consent. Deng documents a list of these allowed works, among whom are EH. Carr,
Robert Gilpin, Robert Jervis, and Kenneth Waltz. Yong Deng, 311, 320-322.
15 Andrew J. Nathan and Robert S. Ross, The Great Wall and the Empty Fortress (New York:
W. W. Norton & Company, 1997), 27.
16
Jack Child, Geopolitics and Conflict in South America: QuarrelsAmong Neighbors (New
York: Praeger Publishers, 1985), 22. "Classical" geopolitical theory begins with the idea of the organic
state. It is noteworthy that Child adds the following observations: "The nation state is a living organism
that requires living space, resources, and a purpose; the state also has a life cycle in which it is created,
matures, declines, and finally disappears." Because there are other states also experience this same cycle,
a sense of Darwinian competition exists, "with stronger states devouring the weaker ones and
incorporating them into their spheres of influence." Many chapters in US national history (for example,
Manifest Destiny, the Monroe Doctrine, the Big Stick Policy) were based on geopolitical notions of power,
geographical advantage, and power politics." So were Alfred Thayer Mahan's theory of sea control, and
Sir Halford Mackinder's theories of land transport. Child, 20-23.
12
improve leverage and reinforce security. Analysts examining Chinese international relations
find this dichotomy consistent throughout PRC history. 17
China is concerned with the relative balance or relative gains occurring among
interacting states. A particular interaction, be it conflict or cooperation, is not necessarily
going to be zero-sum. The Chinese accept the economist's belief that every state involved
may gain, and that perhaps some will gain more than others (interactions are not zero-sum).
China goes a step further, believing that relative differences in these gains among the states
involved matter. (In other words, absolute gains are irrelevant.) It is this difference that is
of primary concern.
Alastair Iain Johnston argues in his assessment of aparabeHum paradigm that China's
perspective ofthe international environment is one of inherent danger, adversaries by nature
threatening, and conflict as zero-sum in which force is ultimately required to deal with threats.
The PRC "stresses absolute flexibility and a conscious sensitivity to changing relative
capabilities. The more this balance is favorable, the more advantageous it is to adopt coercive
strategies; the less favorable, the more advantageous it is to adopt defensive or
accomodationist strategies to buy time." 18
17
"The emerging consensus among Chinese authors is that national interests in international
relations can be understood sui generis and are to be separated from domestic politics." Yong Deng, 310,
313.
18
Johnston, "Cultural Realism and Strategy in Maoist China," 219-220.
13
The PRC has not been a status quo power. 19 But neither is it a rogue state. Although
dissatisfied with its international stature, China is striving to raise its international stature by
fueling economic growth and facilitating military modernization. Raising, or trying to raise,
its stature by open military aggression is not China's strategy nor particularly in its interest.
That is to say, the use of force remains a prospect in the PRC's security strategies, but it is
not necessarily the priority. Pursuing economic growth and military modernization enables
China to strengthen its influence regionally, to reinforce its international self-perception, and
to bolster arguments for greater Chinese stature to the rest ofthe world.
At the same time, the amount of effort China is directing to its economic growth and
military modernization alarms its neighbors and increasingly draws US concern. Because of
ambiguities surrounding Chinese regional intentions, some Western experts on China and
foreign policy analysts argue that the United States and its allies need to conduct a greater
effort to contain and counter, at a minimum, China's growing regional power. This "China
Threat" school prefers to address the problems now and not face what will be a much more
difficult challenge later. Western realist fears hinge on what China may be able to do with its
power once it is no longer held back by current constraints on PRC behavior. In this thesis,
analysts in this group will be categorized as China "pessimists." This containment argument
poses a particular problem, however, in that it relies heavily on deterrence. Although it is
19
Segal and Yang, 1. Segal has also characterized the Chinese as having "the least commitment
to the status quo of any important power. It wishes to occupy Taiwan and take territory from most of its
neighbors in East Asia. It wishes to join the World Trade Organization but without being bound by the
dispute settlement mechanism or other rules that bind all other members. It wishes to have access to our
markets but not to provide access to its own. It wishes to sell dangerous weapons around the world and
dangerous technology to the likes of Iran." Gerald Segal, "We Can Shape China as a Congenial
Superpower," Los Angeles Times, 7 August, 1995, B5; cited by Roy ? "The China Threat' Issue," 761.
14
believed that deterrence as practiced during the Cold War between the United States and
Soviet Union averted nuclear war, the conclusion is debated. Using similar deterrence
strategies to contain Communist China is more problematical and doubtful than deterrence
was against the Soviet Union. Reactions to the Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests earlier this
year resulted in a split among the powers in the Group ofEight on sanctions. While Canada,
the United States, and Japan enacted sanctions, the British, French, and Russians stood
opposed. It is questionable that the United States has the range of influence to build a global
consensus to begin and sustain a containment effort against China.
Other Asia analysts oppose any effort to portray China as either a "rogue" or
"hegemonistic" power. The historical record ofthe PRC, particularly in the last two decades,
does not support claims of rogue behavior, nor would it be in China's national security
interest to be viewed as such. At worst, it desires to emulate, in its own region, US
dominance in the Western Hemisphere. To apply ether the rogue or hegemonistic label could
very likely bring about that very behavior by China (a self-fulfilling prophecy.)20 In this thesis,
analysts in this group will be categorized as China "optimists."
Johnston, in a recent examination of the PRC's international dispute behavior from
1949 to 1992, argues that during the Cold War, the PRC was more dispute-prone than the
other major powers except for the United States. And "while China was not the most likely
20
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of the major powers to fall into crises and militarized conflicts, it was more likely to use a
higher level ofviolence than other states in such a dispute.''''21
Johnston provided two caveats to his dispute-prone, force-intensive assessment. First,
China's past force-intensive disputes revolved around territorial disagreements. Although in
the post-Cold War period China has resolved some border disputes with Laos, Kazakhstan,
Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Russia, China still has unresolved boundary or territorial disputes
with Russia, Tajikistan, North Korea, Vietnam, India, Japan, Malaysia, the Philippines, and
Brunei. 22 This is not an auspicious caveat. Johnston's second caveat, however, is more
promising:
the growth of China's relative power capabilities by itselfhas not led to an increase
in Chinese dispute proneness . Rather, as China's share of world power resources
has increased— and by extension as the perceived gap between ascribed and desired
international status has closed— China has tended not to act in a more conflictual
manner.
23
There is insufficient evidence to support the conclusion that China's growing capabilities will
necessarily result in more danger to regional security.
Characteristic ofa Realpolitik perspective, China places a premium on protecting state
sovereignty. The Chinese emphasis, however, is surprisingly strong for a state in today's
21
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climate ofinternational organizations and multinational corporations/4 China takes the realist
concept ofunitary acting states engaging in power politics and reifies sovereignty. 25 In Jiang
Zemin's political report to the Fourteenth National Chinese Communist Party Congress, the
Chinese President stated, "When it comes to issues involving national interests and state
sovereignty, China will never concede to outside pressure."26
China also prefers bilateral to multilateral diplomacy. Wary of strengthening global
customs and norms which detract from its ability to determine its own security, China resorts
to bilateral diplomacy because it tends to be less confining— meaning that it entails less
Y^ intrusion on state sovereignty. Optimists counter assertions of a Chinese bilateral preference
by referring to China's involvement in arms control agreements for supporting evidence.
Chinese participation in arms control has grown in scope, particularly in the post-Cold War
period. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
(CTBT), and testing moratorium supposedly counter Chinese bilateral preference arguments.
But China's participation in these arms control agreements has been largely due to two factors
U fa-
— a reluctant response to international political pressure or the recognition of significant
relative gains for China. 27 If China can adequately solve a particular problem using either of
'J
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two methods with each resulting in essentially identical outcomes, and one is a bilateral
agreement while the other is multilateral, the PRC will opt for the bilateral agreement.
2. Complex Interdependence
Bridging realism and its liberal competitors within the international relations theory
spectrum is complex interdependence. The concept has been around since the start of the
Twentieth Century, but gained in strength in the post-Cold War period. Robert O. Keohane
and Joseph S. Nye elaborated a theory in the late 1970s with three main characteristics.
First, multiple channels connect societies, including: informal ties between
governmental elites as well as formal foreign office arrangements; informal ties
among nongovernmental elites; and transnational organizations. . . . Second, the agenda
of interstate relationships consists of multiple issues that are not arranged in a clear
lor consistent hierarchy. . . . Third, military force is not used by governments toward
other governments within the region, or on the issues, when complex interdependence
prevails.
28
Keohane and Nye's first characteristic applies to China today. Their second characteristic is
debatable. And the third characteristic is the least likely to be found prevailing in Chinese
behavior.
China's Realpolitik perspective shares its relative gains outlook with complex
interdependence. Keohane and Nye argue:
Two different perspectives can be adopted for analyzing the costs and benefits of an
interdependent relationship. The first focuses on the joint gains or joint losses to the
parties involved. The other stresses relative gains and distributional losses. Classical
economists adopted the first approach in formulating their powerful insight about
comparative advantage: that undistorted international trade will provide overall net
benefits. Unfortunately, an exclusive focus on joint gain may obscure the second key
issue: how those gains are divided. Many of the crucial issues of interdependence
revolve around the old question of politics, "who gets what?"29




Beyond the relative gains and the influences of multiple channels, the inroads
interdependence concepts have made with CCP leaders is limited. China's leaders embrace
economic interdependence out of convenience because it involves enhanced leverage over
other states, giving China an excuse to exercise power politics and interfere in other states'
national affairs. 30 Beijing finds it convenient to manipulate economic interdependence to
justify aspects of its domestic economic restructuring— without admitting claims of liberal
erosion oftraditional Maoist values— as well as to increase its ties with Taiwan and thus the
strings available to manipulate the island. 31 Since limitations of its own choosing (the
conventional military forces available) and limitations of the international environment
currently prevent Beijing from forcing Taiwan to rejoin the mainland, Beijing is willing to
explore interdependence methods.
Liberal concepts in general have some influence on Chinese policy, as China is
noticeably more susceptible to ideas and policies of interdependence, multilateralism, and
collective security. 32 But China's international perceptions remain Realpolitik. China may
-
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contradict the realist outlook at times. However, this is probably because the situation forces
them to do so or because they see greater gains from Chinese compliance.
There are a few Chinese scholars and even Chinese officials who accept or promote
the Western liberal theories like complex interdependence. But even these scholars and






officials remain wary, perplexed by the coexistence of interdependence and power. 33 Yong
Deng, in an interview with one Chinese academic "liberal," noted that there is difficulty to
accept the ideal of complex interdependence when quite obviously "the most advanced and
most 'internationalist' country [engages] in hegemonic behavior in the pursuit of a narrow,
myopic self-interest under high sounding excuses."34 Is interdependence, along with other
Western liberal international relations theories, merely a tool in a larger context of extending
Western hegemony? As long as that doubt exists, interdependence cannot become the
dominant factor in Chinese international relations.
Aside from the manipulation of economic interdependence in certain cases, the
blurring of the realist domestic-international dichotomy provides noticeable evidence of a
slow erosion of realist perceptions, whether acknowledged or not. The reliance of Chinese
economic success on interstate commerce reflects this, as does China's adherence to various
international institutions, treaties, and regimes. 35 Some Western analysts of Chinese
international relations argue that considering these situations, continued use of a domestic-
international dichotomy to describe Chinese behavior oversimplifies the complex dynamics
of Chinese post-Cold War security that are essential for making informed assessments. 36










However, the domestic-international dichotomy is sufficient to understand Chinese post-Cold
War national security behavior.
B. CHINESE NATIONAL SECURITY OBJECTIVES
The post-Cold War security environment has been conducive to the pursuit of the
PRC's national security objectives; particularly because for the first time in more than a
hundred years, China is without a significant external security threat. 37 An examination of
perceived Chinese security threats today and into the future reveals, however, several
emerging significant security concerns. Of these, the most significant national security threat
China faces is the loss of CCP legitimacy with all its domestic implications. Contributing to
the CCP legitimacy equation are a number offactors including domestic and regional stability,
Chinese "great power" status, Chinese regional influence, and the future of energy and other
resources.
As these last two decades have progressed, the CCP has encountered increasingly
more serious challenges to its legitimacy. This is a trend that originated with Deng
Xiaoping' s economic reforms in 1979. Challenges strengthened through the 1980s,
generating the 1989 Tiananmen debacle. The problem has only become more complicated
as a result ofthe shift to a domestic "performance-based" legitimacy in wake of the Cold War
7
There is no significant external security threat, no significant regional instability, and the
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socialist ideological collapse. 39 Weakening CCP legitimacy is a concern among Chinese
optimists and pessimists. This legitimacy situation has progressed to the point that "the PRC
today is a weak state pretending to be a strong state"40 Performance-based legitimacy means
that an economic downturn would cascade into a crisis that could ve*y well threaten CCP rule
and state internal cohesion.
The declining legitimacy ofthe Chinese Communist Party is reflected by several pieces
of evidence: the CCP's loss of a distinct identity, accelerated by the passing of Deng
Xiaoping; a decline ofthe CCP's control over the state's peripheries due to increasing wealth
and a restive population; pending environmental problems that threaten to undermine
economic development; and a growing inability to control information. 41 This loss of control
theme resonates nowhere else as strongly as with the level of state corruption.
Historically, the level of corruption is accepted as one of the best proven symptoms
ofthe extent to which the state has lost its legitimacy. Corruption in post-Mao China
has been increasing so rampantly and multifariously as to make it a single measuring
stick for state legitimacy and state effectiveness (capacity.)42
Though corruption has always been a problem in the PRC, it has never spread to the extent
allowed as a result ofDeng Xiaoping' s economic reforms. To signify it has the legitimacy
problem imder control, the CCP must first reverse the spreading corruption. But this remains
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effecting corrective measures requires sweeping economic changes from the local to the
national levels ofgovernment, from the private to the state sectors, and across the civilian and
the military sectors. Harlan Jencks notes,
Central leaders are vitally concerned to maintain political and economic discipline
against the rising internal forces of regional and provincial autonomy. . . . Political and
economic leaders in the southern provinces strongly favor further expanded trade and
investment links with Southeast Asia. . . . For the remainder ofthe 1 990s, PRC foreign
policy will continue to be decided in Peking— albeit disrupted somewhat by regional
leaders, businessmen, criminals, and even PLA officers, who will sometimes work at
cross-purposes with Peking.43
This would be the mechanism through which an economic downturn threatens the CCP.
Recently, Jiang Zemin has tried to yet again to effect measures to reduce corruption,
clamping down on military enterprises and embarking on long needed reforms to the vast,
ailing state-owned enterprises. These current efforts are not the first time in the 1990s Jiang
has made efforts to curb corruption. Earlier efforts proved to be ineffective. Local leaders,
be they party or military, have increasingly become apathetic toward non-economic issues,
instead choosing to focus on economic successes, be they through legitimate means or
otherwise. The corruption problem is a catch-22 for Beijing: crack down harshly and likely
stifle economic growth and undermine its cohesive nationalism, or look the other way and
keep economic success going but seeing the center's control weaken. In either case, finding
a way out of this paradox requires at a minimum regional stability.
1. Economics and Stability
It. seems to be a contradiction to claim that regional stability is a Chinese national
security objective considering the earlier point made that the PRC is not a status quo power.
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The need for stability is the nuance which distinctively separates Chinese behavior from being
rogue despite desiring to improve its stature from its present stature in the international status
quo.
The majority of conflicts globally in the post-Cold War era have been intrastate rather
than interstate. 44 These intrastate conflicts increasingly involve ethnic conflict, a troubling
trend for China that factors into its domestic concerns. Considering China's economic
fragmentation and its corruption dilemma, regional stability is necessary to enable the CCP
to retain state cohesion on its periphery. Undermining the current economic climate invites
disaster.! Stability fosters the needed climate for continued economic growth which subsumes
any widespread domestic unrest.. This reason undermines Chinese pessimists fears of a
regionally aggressive PRC. "Chinese economic growth, which is essential for domestic
political stability, would be placed in jeopardy ifthe PRC triggered [even] a region-wide arms
race — nuclear or conventional," let alone open conflict which could portray China as an
aggressor.
45
Complicating China's need for regional stability is the level of corruption in the PLA,
primarily involving unauthorized economic ventures. While the PLA has benefitted from
Chinese economic success, China's military strength remains adversely affected twice-round.
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Not only do questions emerge about where certain PLA unit loyalties lie— with the PLA or
their enterprises— but also to what extent military readiness and professionalism is suffering.
The extent ofPLA involvement in the economic sector is a serious cause for concern. "In
addition to the most obvious reasons (graft, corruption, and the possible stifling of legitimate
private enterprise) [there] is a more fundamental concern; namely, that military units are
becoming so involved in economic activities that they are forgetting their primary mission of
training to defend the nation."46
The PLA owns some ofChina's prime real estate and has leased it out at high rents.
Many local airlines are owned and managed by PLA front companies. PLA ships and
other modes of transport are put to good commercial use (and are heavily involved
in smuggling rings.) The PLA's once elite hospitals will now admit those who can
afford the price of admission. Virtually every military unit has set up one form or
another of cottage industry, and many are involved in joint ventures with foreign
entities. The General Staff Department has invested in several "five-star" hotels in
China, including Beijing's luxurious Palace Hotel. Even the vaunted Second
Artillery, which is responsible for the PLA strategic nuclear forces, is a partner in the
Baskin & Robbins ice cream outlet in Beijing.47
When Deng Xiaoping initiated his economic reforms in 1979, military modernization
was near the bottom ofthe priority list. As a result, the PLA had been severely underfunded
in state budgets; so much so that existing forces were deteriorating. This deficiency resulted
in the PLA needing to become innovative in acquiring funds, which in the new era of
economic liberties gave rise to the current economic enterprise situation. 48 Elaborating
further:
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More serious [corrective] steps would mean nothing less than a large-scale reduction
ofthe army's economic activities, and the high command is obviously not ready to do
this. Such a reduction would probably cause a crisis unless PLA units are
compensated by a huge increase of funds, which are not available to the military
leadership.49
2. Great Power Status
Another Chinese security objective is acquiring "great power" status. China's quest
for a niche in the changing international order can be seen as an ongoing struggle in the
course ofwhich they attempt to secure an identity as a global power that others are reluctant
to bestow, while others willingly bestow a negative characterization that China does not
desire.
50 Since the Opium Wars ofthe mid- 1800s, China has been militarily weak; it has been
bullied and invaded by not only its neighbors, but also by Western powers. Beijing sees the
opportunity to reacquire the stature China once knew within its world. Having nearly one
quarter of the planet's population, controlling territory that ranks it behind only Russia and
Canada geographically, and owner of the world's longest continuous civilization, China
considers itself the region's natural leader. Great power status is an image, which requires
sufficient political power leveraged internationally enabling China to first resist the pressure
ofany external meddling in what they consider domestic affairs, and then to exert its will and
shape the regional environment.
If China fulfills its expected potential, it will soon be a power in the class of 19th
century Britain, the Soviet Union, Nazi Germany, Pacific War Japan, and 20 th
century America. Each of those countries used its superior power to establish some
form ofhegemony to protect and promote its interests. . . . This would not necessarily






mean the use of various types of coercion to maintain an environment favorable to
•*cV China's interests, and not necessarily anyone else's.
51
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During the Cold War, China received certain benefits from the bipolar international
environment. Deficient in technology for conventional military capabilities, China
compensated with attritional warfare (Mao's people's war concept.) Combined with nuclear
weapons, Cold War bipolarity, and its geographic position, overwhelming numbers elevated
China to a quasi-great power status. With the normalization of Sino-American relations in
the 1970s, China became the balancer in an Asian balance ofpower between the United States
and the Soviet Union. With the Cold War's collapse, economic inferiority meant China found
itself suddenly demoted in international politics. 52
But the emerging post-Cold War international multipolar environment provides benefits
for the PRC's international outlook and security strategies which had been constrained by the
Cold War environment. A multipolar environment provides a larger range of options from
which to choose and bestows China with a stronger regional position, restoring some ofthe
lost Cold War stature. The multipolar environment also facilitates bilateral diplomacy, which
the Chinese prefer since bilateral diplomacy allows more freedom in negotiating. Bilateral
diplomacy in a multipolar world allows China to exploit contradictions and differences between
friends and enemies, playing them more easily off one another. 53 There is less encroachment
on sovereignty since the need for multilateral compromises is reduced. One ironic aspect of
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a multipolar post-Cold War environment is that it allows Chinese manipulation of the defunct
Cold War Asian balancer situation to make a Russian balancing possible between the United
States and China. China is busy cultivating a Sino-Russian relationship. 54
Multilateralism in a multipolar world, however, does not deprive Beijing entirely of
these negotiating strategies, but flexibility is curtailed. Multilateralism weakens China's
negotiating leverage by requiring greater cooperation and concessions. The need for greater
compromise confines Chinese diplomacy and often requires concessions that undermine
sovereignty.
3. PRC Regional Influence
While the changing international environment degraded China's global stature, its
regional stature has strengthened, particularly in light of Japan's financial turmoil and the
recent Southeast Asian crises. China's regional status prompts concerns about China's
aspirations. Neighboring states warily eye China's modernization efforts. China pessimists
see the PRC mincing words and using legalisms to obscure its goals and thus prefer to assume
the worst.
Yet, pessimists place too much credit on questionable statistics, especially about the
PRC's military modernization efforts. The problem of officially underfiinding the PLA
complicates assessments of China's capabilities and potential. Data on the PRC military
budget is extremely flexible and anything but reliable.
[SIPRI asserts] that total spending by the [PLA] is four to five times the amount
officially reported (which Chinese military officers hotly dispute). If true, this would
put actual 1996 PLA spending at US $35.5 to 44.4 billion. The Heritage Foundation
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puts the upper range estimate at US $40 billion. Japan, in 1996, with the American
nuclear umbrella and the US — Japan Security Treaty, spent about US $45 billion. 55
Of all the budgetary statistics cited, one relationship seems constant: that the PRC's rising
military expenditures barely keep pace with inflation. Considering that of China's 14
neighbors, most either possess or are upgrading to modern weapons that surpass China's large
quantities of outdated weaponry, China's efforts are actually much tamer than pessimists are
willing to admit. 56 As reported by the Pacific Council on International Policy and RAND,
"China's military expenditures as a percentage of total defense expenditures by all Asian
countries have been decreasing steadily since the mid-1970s," this despite RAND's extreme
high assessment of PRC military expenditures. 57 In the wake of US performance with
advanced technology and professional forces in the 1991 Persian Gulf War, China's
modernization efforts are to close what they consider to be currently a 25 year gap in military
capabilities with the West. The drive is moving their defense posture from high quantity, low
quality attritional forces to a lower quantity, but higher quality, rapid-reaction, high-tech force
structure.
Also factoring into some China analyst fears is that in the post-Cold War period, the
United States has risen to take a high priority on China's list of threatening states. China
pessimists would place the United States at the very top of such a list, arguing that China is
deeply angered by de facto US hegemonism. Chinese rhetoric charges that imperialist US
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j American influence both regionally and in China to other states. 58 Michael Yahuda points out
that "war games played against the American 'enemy' have been standard since 1991."59
Militaries necessarily plan for diverse conflict, however. To learn that China did not plan for
a US eventuality would be a surprise.
China believes regional leadership (even regional hegemony) rightly belongs to it, and
thus Beijing constantly denounces hegemonism as a crime perpetuated primarily by American
"self-appointed international cops."
60 The rhetoric can be particularly bitter. Commented by
one Chinese official:
[The United States'] strategy towards China is to, through economic activities and
trade, control and sanction China and force China to change the course of its ideology
and make it incline towards the West; take advantage of opening up, personnel
exchanges, and propaganda means to make ideological infiltration into China's upper
strata; give financial assistance to hostile forces both inside and outside Chinese
territories and wait for the opportune moment to stir up turbulence.61
But China would just as readily attempt to exercise similar regional influence. The PRC
possesses a national goal of regional hegemony akin to the United States position in the
Western Hemisphere. The effective restraint on this ambition is the intermediate need to
maintain economic growth and domestic stability. 62
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Regional security concerns fuel calls from others for greater transparency by the PRC
regarding its military. The logic is that transparency builds greater regional confidence. 63 Such
calls are slowly yielding results as China has recently started publishing defense White Papers.
But transparency conflicts with the Chinese culture of ambiguity, of never giving potential
enemies more information than is necessary lest you make yourself vulnerable. While greater
J.
transparency could foster greater short term stability prospects, it is unclear that transparency
in the longer term aids China's national security. Taken in conjunction with their Realpolitik,
sovereignty, and relative gains perspectives, transparency must ultimately provide a much
greater security gain in the way of increased stability to China to compensate for the loss of
sovereignty and the inevitable external meddling military transparency would bring.
4. Energy Resources
Of a growing concern in China's national security equation is the need for energy to
support its growing economy. It is expected that China will be a net oil importer by the year
2000 and some argue that this is already the case. 64 The domestic oil infrastructure is aging
and scattered, distant from markets and lacking in infrastructure to deliver. Oil fields in
northeast China matured years ago and are declining. In the northwest, Xinjiang oil reserves
are far from Chinese commercial centers. The politically sensitive South China Sea will be the
only potential remaining source of "domestic" oil for China. 65 Disputed are the territorial
rights to many parts ofthe South China Sea, including the Paracel and Spratly Island groups.
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China insists that it has sovereignty over these groups and much of the seabed in general. The
Chinese government maintains that China possesses sovereignty over the South China Sea, but
is ready to cooperate with the countries concerned to exploit jointly petroleum and gas. 66
Another Chinese strategist notes:
for the mid- and short-term, no matter how nuclear energy develops, it will be
impossible to change our energy makeup of mostly coal. From a technology and
economics perspective, importing clean coal technology will be more in line with
China's national and long-range interests. The World Bank projects that, at a
7-percent annual growth rate, China will have to rebuild 80 percent of its industrial
production capacity by 2020. 67
Speculations like these raise concerns that China's need for future energy reserves to
continue economic development might result in Chinese aggressiveness or spark confrontations
regionally. Insufficient energy resources will negatively affect Chinese economic development.
And as already argued, if economic development it is highly likely that domestic unrest will
threaten the CCP. In all likelihood, the rapid use of force would be needed out of fears of
domestic unrest cascading into a repeat of Soviet, then Russian, ethnic troubles.
C. NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND CHINESE NATIONAL INTERESTS
1. Nuclear Doctrine and Strategy
Considering these security concerns— economics and stability, great power status,
regional influence, and energy and resources— nuclear weapons and missile delivery systems
contribute to China's national security in three distinct ways. First, nuclear weapons and
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ballistic missile delivery capabilities innoculate China from its historical problem of being
subject to nuclear coercion by other nuclear states. In the 1950s with both the Korean conflict
and the Taiwan Strait crises, the United States issued veiled threats of nuclear attack (and
sometimes not so veiled) to coerce China into acting according to American regional designs.
Similar Chinese fears ofthe Soviet Union emerged in the late 1960s following the Sino-Soviet
split. These historical incidents remain prominent in China's memory and preventing its being
the recipient offurther nuclear coercive threats is the fundamental concern supporting China's
continued possession of nuclear weapons.
Furthermore, nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles also act as a hedge against other
states' desires to interfere internally in China. The preceding argument shows the need for
these weapons systems, in Beijing's eyes, to negate threats from others regarding either actual
or potential state external action on the part of China. These weapons systems also give pause
to states who might otherwise be tempted to interfere internally in China's affairs. Two
plausible cases would be in the event China needs to act with force within its land borders
(another Tiananmen) or with Taiwan. (Would the United States be willing to trade Los
Angeles for Taipei?)68
Second, Beijing perceives its possession of nuclear weapons and ballistic missile
delivery systems as a boost for great power status at a time when other national factors that
could individually support that status are inadequate. China's qualitative conventional military
capabilities and economics could eventually support great power status on their own merits,




whether the pace of economic and military progress can be sustained. Because of China's
inadequate conventional power projection capabilities which confine China to largely a
regional security player, nuclear weapons and ballistic missile systems ensure that China has
extra-regional influence.
Third, nuclear weapons are viewed as a hedge against any degradation of regional
stability. Of the fourteen states sharing borders with China, three are in disarray, and others
are in poor condition. Particular problems are Tajikistan, North Korea, and Myanmar. Russia
is in questionable condition, as is Pakistan. This peripheral uncertainty leaves China uneasy.
Some of these states have nuclear weapons while others are believed to be pursuing nuclear
weapons and already possess ballistic missile capabilities. China has growing concerns about
North Korea's nuclear efforts, Japan's virtual nuclear capability, and India's nuclear
intentions. 69 Concerns about the Russian nuclear arsenal also exist, but current conditions
reflected by the Sino-Russian strategic partnership subordinate Chinese concerns to concerns
about other neighbors. In this context, the idea of deterring neighbors is becoming a far more
critical component of both China's national strategy and the Asian security equation.
Despite these three ways in which nuclear weapons contribute to China's security, for
the first twenty years of its post detonation nuclear history the PRC has not clearly defined a
guiding nuclear weapons doctrine. 70 What little public discussion or comment made prior to
69
Despite India's nuclear tests in May 1998, the extent of its nuclear weapons arsenal is
uncertain. The motivations surrounding the tests are also disputed.
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"Unlike the other nuclear powers, especially those of the West typified by the United States,
China has never really enunciated a well defined strategic nuclear doctrine in the manner of the massive
retaliation doctrine or the flexible response doctrine declared respectively by the United States Secretary of
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the mid-1980s by the Chinese regarding nuclear weapon employment (or restraints) served
"important polemical and tactical purposes, but skirted fundamental security issues."71
In the Cold War era of China's nuclear history, several tenets originated that have
become repetitive mantras for the PRC: no-first-use (NFU), defensive purpose, goal of total
disarmament, a disdain for "deterrence," and disbelief in a nuclear taboo. The declared policy
ofnever being the first to use nuclear weapons at any time under any circumstances dates from
the first nuclear test ofOctober 16, 1964. The NFU pledge has been a public mainstay ofthe
PRC's arms control posture to the present, most recently appearing in negotiations
surrounding the CTBT. 72 The Chinese claim "that the benefits of an NFU treaty would include
reduced risk ofwar, enhanced security of the five nuclear-weapon states, greater mutual trust,
reduced likelihood of nuclear proliferation, and advancement toward the goal of complete
nuclear disarmament."73 Questions remain as to how much China would actually practice its
preaching, since the NFU pledge presents contradictions with its emerging nuclear force
strategy. It is also clear that China's NFU pledges in no way apply to Taiwan. 74
The PRC has also practiced what Lin calls a "slogan-like repetition" regarding nuclear
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yielding no sign of any evolving or coherent nuclear weapon doctrine. 75 Public statements
have yielded no concrete guidelines for nuclear weapon employment; instead Beijing insists
on when it will not use nuclear weapons and downplays the possibility of employment. 76
China publicly rejects the Western concept of nuclear deterrence, although in practice
the Chinese nuclear posture exhibits many similarities as well as differences with the nuclear
postures of Western states. Publicly, Chinese political and military leaders avoid using
"deterrence" to describe the purpose of their own nuclear arsenal, choosing instead to
wordsmith its purpose as "defense" and "self-protection." China has not been as explicit about
the manipulation of risk as Western governments have been. In Chinese analyses, Western
risk-taking behavior is considered a path to miscalculation and inadvertent nuclear war. 77
Despite China's denials, its nuclear defense efforts amount to deterrence.
It is argued by some that as the nuclear era has progressed from 1945 a prohibition
against the use of nuclear weapons has crept into the international arena— a nuclear taboo
— including a prohibition against the use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states. 78
China dismisses this normative taboo on a couple of counts. The Chinese believe it is possible
to achieve political goals through the use of nuclear weapons despite the consequences
typically associated by normative taboo proponents with nuclear weapons use such as
75
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environmental devastation and international condemnation. This Clausewitzian distinction
provides the basis for China's belief that graduated escalation control is possible. 79
Another reason for China's dismissal of the normative taboo reflects also its criticism
of Western mutually assured destruction (MAD). "If a state is incapable of using nuclear
weapons short ofprovoking mutual suicide, then deterrence threats are not credible."80 China
insists that a state in possession of nuclear weapons must have the will to use those weapons
in combat, or else the touted deterrent effect is lost. 81 But, if the Chinese do not subscribe to
the concept ofMAD, then a problem exists in the nuclear deterrence equation, especially in
light ofthe United States and Russian arsenal reduction efforts through START I, n, and HI.
For most ofthe PRC's Cold War nuclear history, Western experts on Chinese security
diagnosed the PRC's nuclear strategy as one of "minimal deterrence", which is "a strategy to
deter a rational attack by relying on a small strategic nuclear force capable of inflicting very
limited, and yet unacceptable, damage to an enemy." This diagnosis ofminimum deterrence
remained the leading, but still disputed, assessment through the end of the Cold War. Yet,
minimum deterrence was (and is) denounced by Beijing as "inadequate to deter anything much
more than a countervalue first strike."82
Minimum deterrence does not accurately categorize Chinese nuclear strategy in the
post-Cold War period. Lin claims the PRC's efforts to acquire a tactical nuclear capability,
79
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as well as efforts to expand the qualitative spectrum of nuclear weapons and interest in
defense-in-depth concepts contradict a minimum deterrence assessment. 83 In Johnston's view,
China's nuclear strategy has evolved to one of limited warfighting, defined as:
. . .the development of enough capabilities to deter conventional, theatre and strategic
war and to suppress escalation during a nuclear war. This requires a sufficient range
ofweapons and operational capabilities, essentially, to respond to any level of attack.
The response need not be a one-to-one matching of technical capabilities, merely
enough to raise the costs of war dramatically for the adversary. A recognizable,
realistic ability to fight and inflict sufficient counterforce and countervalue damage on
an aggressor assures deterrence; and if that fails, it assures an ability to prevent an
enemy victory. 84
Johnston argues the limited warfighting strategy because of five dimensions of Chinese nuclear
forces: first, China rejects MAD in favor of controllable escalation; second, a credible ability
to fight a nuclear war and achieve their political goals; third, a diverse targeting doctrine that
is only becoming more complex and diverse as missile force improvements occur; fourth, a
survivable nuclear force, which has been the case since the early 1980s when China first
established its second-strike capability; and fifth, a growing emphasis on preemptive strike,
be it nuclear or conventional. 85 Lin also argues that China's nuclear strategy fits the war-
fighting concept better than the minimum deterrence concept, although the war-fighting
concept, too, is insufficient to describe their strategy. Often components of a war-fighting
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86 The ten components are: Diversification, combined arms, nuclear tactics, civil defense,
postnuclear warfare, massive arsenal, counterforce targeting, survival of C3I, strategic and air defenses,
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Surrounding assessments of the PRC's nuclear doctrine and strategy is China's
continued reliance on traditional deception and ambiguity. "Ambiguity consists of massive
concealment, or secrecy, peppered with revelation — selective, deliberate, and at times
redundant." Lin summarizes this characteristic as, aptly, "artful."87 Efforts to determine
China's nuclear doctrine reveal deceptive measures, saying one thing while enacting another.
Johnston asserts "the [Chinese nuclear] doctrinal ambiguity was deliberate, designed to keep
potential adversaries guessing about the form, timing and targeting of Chinese retaliation in
the event of nuclear attack."88 Johnston additionally notes that during "the last few years as
Chinese strategists have indeed produced more scholarship and analyses of nuclear doctrine,
the deliberate ambiguity claim is more credible, as relatively few ofthese analyses are in open
circulation material. A number of Chinese scholars, long associated with China's nuclear
weapons programme, have claimed that the lack of doctrinal transparency today is
deliberate"89 Nuclear force composition, modernization, and deployment provide the means
to penetrate the ambiguities and deception through the added benefit of being able to
distinguish between expressed visions and operational practice. 90
2. China and Post-Cold War Nuclear Arms Control
China's possession of nuclear weapons ultimately creates greater dilemmas for its
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multilateralism of the nuclear arms control and nonproliferation regimes poses problems. A
tradeoff occurs, a paradox of sorts, in that China possesses nuclear weapons to ward off
coercive threats and external meddling in its domestic affairs and at the same time it invites that
meddling in national security with these regimes. China's increased participation in nuclear
arms control negotiations and commitments is used to counter any Realpolitik assessment of
PRC behavior. Such arguments against Realpolitik claim that the PRC's arms control and
disarmament behavior in the post-Cold War period— which includes accession to the NPT,
signing the CTBT, and the imposition of a nuclear testing moratorium — reflect an
interdependence and multilateral character, not power politics. But China's participation in
these agreements and forums reflects the growing influence of interdependence on Beijing and
the motivations for participating in each case reflect relative security gains. One such
motivation is perceiving the need to check a qualitative arms race with the West. 91 China's
involvement in multilateral arms control programs is largely a form ofRealpolitik, to either
take advantage of relative gains or mitigate the negative consequences of international
momentum, not a multilateral perspective. 92
China wants to keep its nuclear forces out of the arms control and disarmament arena
as long as possible. China's fast retreat on its Comprehensive Program for Disarmament in
the 1980s, its handling of its involvement in the CTBT negotiations, and the growing problem
with China's expressed stand on superpower strategic arms reduction are evidence of a
disconnection between public advocacy of arms control measures and ponying up to their
91
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yadvocacy words. 93 Malik notes that China's arms control strategy reflects desires to increase
China's capabilities relative to the other nuclear powers, avoid both bilateral and multilateral
processes if possible, shift views of regional security from the nuclear issue to security in
general, and conduct a public arena "spin" that tells the world what it wants to hear while
China acts in a completely different manner. 94
In the post-Cold War period, three significant arms control regimes have factored into
Chinese nuclear strategy: the NPT, the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), and the
CTBT. Two other areas, arms reduction treaties and nuclear disarmament, have played lesser
but still important roles in Chinese national security strategy.
a. Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
China acceded to the NPT on 9 March 1992; a surprising development because of
China's previous persistent charges of discrimination by the NPT against non-nuclear,
developing states. 95 A reassessment of the security threats posed by potential nuclear
neighbors generated the shift in policy, and was due to reluctant need, not any shift from a
Realpolitik perception. Growing awareness of the consequences nuclear proliferation poses
for Chinese security has been slowly changing China's nonproliferation perspectives. Nuclear
proliferation will generate new need for regional balances among states, sparks fears of nuclear
states ganging up on China, prospects for uncertain nuclear status and capabilities, even to the
93
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Jpoint of not knowing or suspecting nuclear possession, which China particularly fears of
Japan.
96
Beijing considers that the most likely place where nuclear weapons would be used
is South Asia, in a conflict between India and Pakistan. 97 Nuclear potential in North Korea,
Japan, and Taiwan triggered the realization in China of the merits of the NPT. By embracing
the treaty and associated regimes, China aims to slow the prospects for regional proliferation
detrimental to its security while securing the ability to have some influence in the system. The
Chinese perception is that the world is fast moving in the direction of complex, multiple
nuclear deterrence, and that nuclear proliferation is inevitable. If this is true, membership in
the NPT can only be seen as an attempt to slow proliferation, not prevent it. 98
The level of China's commitment to the NPT is questionable, however, in light of its
evasiveness, mincing of words, and unsafeguarded nuclear assistance (e.g., to Pakistan and
Iran). Only recently has China retreated from nuclear cooperation with Iran. This retreat
stemmed more from the desire to improve Sino-American relations, the inability of Iran to pay,
and a growing appreciation for stability in the Middle East, which keeps oil prices low, than
from concern for compliance with the NPT commitment. 99 "The fact is that the Chinese
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continue to circumvent the NPT guidelines if doing so serves their strategic and economic
interests."
100
The bureaucracy responsible for managing Chinese nuclear arms control efforts is also
rife with contradictions and inefficiencies. Two ofthe three nuclear agencies tasked with arms
control management contain a conflict of interest in that Jiang Xinxiong heads both the China
Atomic Energy Authority, which is responsible for nuclear nonproliferation, and the China
National Nuclear Corporation, which promotes nuclear exports. 101 The organizations which
are involved in the missile trade are controlled by the military, "which is always willing to
either bend the rules or turn a blind eye in securing lucrative foreign orders." 102
China's desires to restrict the growth of international norms stem from their state
sovereignty concerns and are reflected in both their testing ofthe limits of agreements they've
committed to, as well as in their non-compliance with other existing multilateral agreements
that they have not signed. Pressure on Beijing to not only adhere to the agreements already
committed to, but to join additional arms control regimes that portray arms control agreements
as international norms is counterproductive. This is exactly why China remains cool toward
such regimes. Strong relative gains, regionally or globally, or prospects for detrimental
negative effects if China does not comply must be shown before China will engage in such
processes. 103
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b. Missile Technology Control Regime
The MTCR poses a slightly different problem for Chinese security. Unlike other
multilateral arms control agreements, China was specifically excluded by the United States
from MTCR drafting processes due to US concerns toward Chinese access to sensitive missile
design information. The result is that although the MTCR has been in effect since 1987, China
is not officially a member. Nevertheless, in February 1992 Beijing agreed to abide by it. 104
As with its interpretations of the NPT, China uses loose interpretations of the MTCR
missile and technology restrictions, if not ignoring them outright, which generates questions
regarding the level of Beijing's commitment. Apparently,
China transferred 300-km-range M-l 1 short-range ballistic missiles to Pakistan in
violation of its commitment. . . . China also appears to be aiding Pakistan in building
a plant to manufacture M-l 1 missiles or copies of them. . . . There is additional concern
that Pakistan is developing a medium-range ballistic missile called the Ghauri, as
confirmed by the recently departed director of the CIA's Nonproliferation Center.
China may be providing assistance in that effort. 105
But at the time ofthe transfer, China argued that the M-l 1 met the MTCR guidelines
which restricted the transfer of missiles with a range of greater than 300 km and a payload of
greater than 500 kg. (The M-l 1 range was advertised at less than 300 km, but the United
States alleges that, with a lighter warhead, the range can easily be exceeded.) What resulted
was a change to the MTCR guidelines in January 1 993 to extend transfer prohibitions to any
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The Chinese view the MTCR as yet another discriminatory arms control regime
L
designed to codify the capabilities gap between the developed West and the rest of the world.
Aircraft and ground (tactical) delivery methods are left unaddressed by the MTCR, resulting
in an accompanying double standard charge since highly developed countries possess a
substantial advantage over others in this regard, making it nearly impossible for a developing
country to stave offcoercion from the privileged few. The M-9 missile, the export variant of
the DF-15 used in the 1995-1996 Taiwan Strait episodes, meets neither the original nor the
revised January 1993 MTCR standards (its range exceeds the 300 km of the less restrictive
original MTCR standard), raising questions about China's commitment to the entire regime.
c. Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
The CTBT is not currently in China's interests, as it complicates the modernization of
its nuclear forces by impeding research and development of smaller and lighter warheads which
might be used in multiple independently-targeted reentry vehicle (MIRV) delivery systems and
tactical nuclear weapons. The CTBT also becomes one more shackle on China's sovereignty
in the security realm. The problem is that China can neither back out of the regime or try to
kill it. The CTBT is championed by non-nuclear-weapon states to constrain the evolution of
nuclear weapons, impede proliferation, and possibly reverse the numbers and sizes of nuclear
arsenals while advancing toward nuclear disarmament.
Delaying tactics were imposed to stretch out treaty negotiations, including Chinese
insistence on inclusion of a provision allowing for an exemption for peaceful nuclear
explosions (PNEs) and on inclusion of language committing parties to the CTBT to a NFU
pledge. Both provisions were eventually dropped and China did sign the CTBT in September
45
1996, after the United States signed. China has not yet ratified the treaty, and will likely wait
to do so until the latest possible moment. Apparently, the delays permitted the completion of
the necessary Chinese nuclear testing for the latest round of modernization, and Beijing
announced a testing moratorium two months prior to its signing the CTBT.
d. Strategic Arms Reduction Treaties
China is not a partner to any nuclear arms reduction agreement, nor a participant in any
reduction agreement negotiating process. Beijing has been quite clear that before China will
consider becoming involved with any nuclear arms reduction talks, the arsenals of the other
declared nuclear weapons states must first be reduced to a relative equality with China's,
meaning the same magnitude of hundreds ofwarheads vice their current thousands. 107
But China has made such commitments before and quickly walked away when the
conditions the commitment was predicated upon actually emerged. In 1979 China committed
itself before the UN to ioin in disarmament negotiations once "substantial" progress in arms
reductions had occurred between the United States and Soviet arsenals. Three years later
"substantial" became a 50 percent reduction. But once 50 percent reduction targets became
the context of aims negotiations between the superpowers in 1986, China quickly reverted to
its pre-1979 position. 108
Nuclear weapons are political tools that give China a status in world affairs
disproportionate to its actual economic and military capabilities. 109 As long as Beijing assesses
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China's great power status below that which it desires on the considerations of its economic
and conventional military capabilities, Beijing will do nothing that will jeopardize the value of
its nuclear capabilities. This current prerequisite for five-party nuclear arms reduction talks
1
is only a delaying tactic. It will be quite some time before both the United States and Russia
are willing (if ever) to meet this condition of relative arsenal equality, and so Beijing feels it
has evaded any negotiations commitment by raising the bar impossibly high.
e. Disarmament
Although China sees the critical necessity for possessing nuclear weapons, it has
repeatedly expressed desires for global nuclear disarmament. Such a stand does not contradict
its current possession of nuclear weapons. The motivations underlying such persistence
include mobilizing the support ofthe non-nuclear developing world by staking a moral position
in opposition to the position of the four other declared (and Western industrialized) nuclear
states. Some argue that "with a CTBT agreement behind them, such Chinese proposals for
denuclearization provide Beijing with international credibility among the anti-nuclear
constituency at the immediate sacrifice of no particular program or policy of its own. The
main impact would be on the United States and its traditional policy of extended
deterrence." 110 As long as nuclear weapons are in the possession or any state, China sees the
need and will possess them as well.
Ideally, global nuclear disarmament would raise Chinese regional and global influence
in several ways. First, conventional forces become the exclusive measure of state security, and




JRussia. Two, international repercussions for using conventional force coercion are
considerably less severe. Three, China gains a legitimate global coercive ability in that the
most significant impediment to the use of conventionally armed ballistic missiles, especially
ICBMs, would be removed. As long as nuclear weapons exist, any unannounced ICBM
launch is presumed to be nuclear on the part of nuclear states (especially the US and Russia),
potentially precipitating unintended nuclear escalation. In a world without nuclear weapons,
ballistic missiles are released from this restraint on their use and, as a result, China gains a
long-range precision strike capability without the need for an extensive forward naval or air
force presence.
D. SUMMARY
Chinese perceptions of the current international environment are filtered through the
lens of Realpolilik, influenced slightly by economic interdependence theories. Driving its
national security agenda is the necessity to maintain the Communist Party's legitimacy through
continuation of China's remarkable economic growth, domestic stability and regional stability
to allow continued economic growth, building great power status and a de facto regional
hegemony, and the guarantee of sufficient resources, especially energy resources, to keep
Chinese economic (and therefore military) development moving.
Nuclear weapons are currently in the background of Chinese and Asian security
concerns. China is modernizing its nuclear force at a deliberate pace, with the intent of closing
the qualitative gap between China and the West. China would prefer to avoid arms control
constraints but increasingly must incorporate them into its overall national security strategy.
48




III. US BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE PROGRAMS
The United States ballistic missile defense program began in the late 1940s. Today,
the Department of Defense's Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO) is responsible
for the research and development of both theater missile defense (TMD) and national missile
defense (NMD) capabilities. TMD and NMD are meant to deter and, if necessary, counter the
use of ballistic missiles, whatever the warhead type — nuclear, chemical, biological, or
conventional. According to the BMDO, theater missile defense is needed "to protect US
forces, US allies, and other important countries, including areas of vital interest to the United
States from theater missile attacks." 111
A. THEATER MISSILE DEFENSE PROGRAMS
The United States TMD effort is focused on four areas: attack operations, active
defense, passive defense, and battle management/command, control, communications,
computers, and intelligence." 2 The pursuit of TMD (and NMD) capabilities reflects US
pragmatism. As an aspect of the revolution in military affairs (RMA), these capabilities
represent for the most part proven technology, implying to date only marginal modifications
to operations and organization. TMD involves "bottom-up" capabilities. Once the TMD
capability is achieved, the appropriate unit level tactics, theater level operations, and
organization at all levels— tactical, operational, and service— are constructed concurrently
or afterward. This includes BMD C 3 I.
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.
51
The four core programs ofTMD are: the Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3),
Navy Area Theater Ballistic Missile Defense, Theater High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD),
and Navy Theater Wide Ballistic Missile Defense. 113 The PAC-3 program is one of two core
lower-tier, endoatmospheric ballistic missile defense systems under development. Land-based,
PAC-3 is intended to counter short range (SRBM) and medium range ballistic missile
(MRBM) threats in theater, effecting kills in the terminal phase of ballistic missile flight. The
cruise missile threat and aircraft threat— be it fixed or rotary winged— are also subjects of
PAC-3 defense.
PAC-3 is proceeding through three configurations. The first, consisting ofBMC3I
improvements and the guidance enhanced missile (GEM), was completed and fielded in 1995.
The second is being fielded after demonstrating a successful theater ballistic missile intercept
in February 1997. The third and final configuration is still in development, consisting of the
PAC-3 interceptor missile.
In all three configurations, PAC-3 is designed to be a rapidly deployable, air-
transportable system consisting offour main components: the launcher, the interceptor missile,
the radar unit, and the system control station. Operations in the 1990-1991 Gulf War and
deployments in 1994 to Korea indicate how much time actual deployments have required. In
the GulfWar, the first Patriot battery arrived 34 days after mobilization, and the second by the
84th day. In 1994, the Commander of US Forces, Korea, needed four months to get the
request for Patriot batteries processed, and another 40 days to receive and deploy them. In
113
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both cases, an inordinate amount of precious airlift capacity was needed to deliver the
systems.
114
The Navy Area Theater Ballistic Missile Defense program is the second core lower-tier
TMD program, also targeting SRBMs and MRBMs in the ballistic missiles' terminal phase.
It is sea-based, relying on the AEGIS combat system on cruisers and destroyers along with a
specially modified version of the SM-2 surface-to-air missile— the SM-2 Block IVA. Navy
Area TMD provides increased positioning freedom for the unified commanders since the
delicate issue of political support by a host nation in theater does not arise.
The Theater High Altitude Area Defense is one oftwo core upper-tier TMD programs
with planned endo- and exoatmospheric kill capabilities. Like PAC-3, which it is intended to
complement, there are four components: a truck-mounted launcher, missile interceptor, radar
unit, and control station.
Unfortunately, THAAD is experiencing several setbacks in development. The last five
interceptor tests were failures. Internally contaminated electronic amplifiers are said to have
caused seeker failures. A three month delay to correct the problem means that the next test
of the THAAD interceptor should occur in the first quarter of calendar year 1999.
The Navy Theater Wide TMD program is the second core upper-tier system. Unlike
the PAC-3 and THAAD concert, this program is to be the follow-on to the Navy Area lower-
tier system, using a new SM-3 interceptor. To have endo and exo&unospheric kill capability
as well, the Navy Theater Wide program is expected to have ascent and midcourse kill
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capability in addition to the terminal phase capability. It "can rely both on ship radars and
satellites, has more than a 1,000-mile range, and can hit fast missiles." 115
Built around deterrence by denial, the United States' BMD strategy has three key
components: first, the four core TMD programs; second, foreign military sales ofTMD to
strengthen allies in their efforts to contend with the ballistic missile threat; third, aggressive
international coordination and consultation on counter-proliferation and non-proliferation of
ballistic missiles.
The Army, emphasizing the need to dominate the maneuver battlefield, is focusing on
the concert of rapidly deployable land-based TMD systems consisting ofPAC-3 and THAAD.
The Navy, with its forward presence and power projection priorities, is pursuing flexibility
through the evolution of the AEGIS combat system with two shipboard TMD systems. The
Marine Corps program emphasizes point defense with the HAWK system.
The Air Force is pursuing "advanced technology for air dominance." Advanced
technologies such as the Boost Phase Intercept (BPI), critical to both THAAD and Navy
Theater Wide upper-tier systems as well as the NMD Ground Based Interceptor (GBI), and
research and development of airborne and space-based lasers keep Air Force efforts behind the
scene and with a longer-ranged vision. Projects designed to improve target identification,
interceptor tasking, and targeting are also within the purview of the Air Force.
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B. NATIONAL MISSILE DEFENSE PROGRAM
More controversial than TMD, national missile defense is more sweeping in vision,
longer-ranged, and less certain in its development. It is also, surprisingly, less complex in its
structure than the joint TMD programs.
Like the TMD programs, NMD is being built around the idea of hit to kill — kinetic
impact with the incoming ballistic missile or its warheads. At one point it was thought that
modified Minuteman II missiles would suffice for first generation interceptors, but through
reliance on off-the-shelf technology and competing contracts, construction of an expressly
designed interceptor— the ground-based interceptor— has proven less complicated and less
expensive. Because of the program's longer-ranged vision and more politically sensitive
nature, NMD is further behind in research and development than the TMD systems.
Verifications of the interceptor exoatmospheric kill sensor and evaluation of contractor
systems resulted in awarding Boeing the interceptor contract in early 1998. Like the land-
based TMD systems, the NMD system will have four main components: launcher, interceptor,
radar unit, and a command unit.
In 1996, the "3+3" concept emerged as the defining map for NMD research and
development. Taking the program through the year 2003, "3+3" involves first a three year
development and planning phase, then a three year system development and deployment
phase. 116 The controversy surrounding NMD yielded the "3+3" concept. Some observers
have characterized it as a way to appease those opposed to NMD (since there is no
1997 Report to the Congress on Ballistic Missile Defense, 3:1.
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commitment to deploying such a system) and a way to appease NMD supporters (because the
program is proceeding, albeit slowly).
C. INTERNATIONAL BMD PARTNERSHIPS OF REGIONAL CONCERN
Several international partners are assisting or may join the United States in BMD
research and concept development. The most significant contributions come from North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) members. As for the Asia-Pacific community, however,
only five states are of particular interest: Japan, Australia, Russia, South Korea, and Taiwan.
The US-Japan BMD relationship is the most controversial for the Chinese. Japan
committed itself to joint TMD research and development efforts with the United States on 30
September 1998. The Japanese decision concluded a delay lasting for months and was made
just weeks after North Korea launched a Taep'o-dong 1 IRBM that not only penetrated
Japan's airspace, but overflew one of its islands. 117 Beyond this recent BMD research and
development agreement, a shared early warning agreement exists. 118 However, Australia is the
most significant contributor to the BMD research effort in the Western Pacific, focusing on
space and ground-based early warning efforts, as well as ballistic missile command, control,
and communications.
The Russian program is probably the one closest to missile defense actualization. The
Russian government already possesses a limited BMD capability, but cooperation with the
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United States involving basic and applied research programs promises improvements which
could make Russia less vulnerable to nuclear deterrent threats.
South Korea is not participating in the research and development process, but it does
host the PAC-3 system which has been deployed in South Korea under the control of US
forces to deal with North Korean missile threats.
Overshadowing these cooperative efforts with the United States, China remains vigilant
regarding Taiwan and US pressure for the island to join in the BMD effort. David Lee,
Taiwan's deputy foreign minister, recently expressed reservations about Taiwan's partnership
in theBMD endeavor. "We are interested in this idea and we are willing to discuss it with the
United States. But it is still in the conceptual stage, so we don't know how much it will cost
or whether this is the correct approach. . . .We'll never rule it out, but it is too early to say ifwe
will participate." 119 Taiwan's Air Force Chief of General Staff, General Tang Fei, expressed
interest, however, in two of the US TMD programs: Patriot PAC-3 and Navy Area Theater
Ballistic Missile Defense. 120
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IV. ASSESSING US MISSILE DEFENSE AND SINO-AMERICAN RELATIONS
A. PLA STRENGTHS AND MISSILE DEFENSES
1. The 1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis
One of the most problematic regional security situations in East Asia is the dispute
between the PRC and the Republic of China (Taiwan). Retaining claims to the island is not
just a matter of territorial cohesion for the PRC. It is also a matter of Chinese Communist
Party (CCP) legitimacy. Although it may not be the most pressing regional flash point, the
Taiwan issue promises to be a larger scale (and longer-term) problem than the crisis on the
Korean peninsula because it holds a greater potential for major-power confrontation (US-
China).
In 1950 Beijing's reluctant consent to North Korea's plans for the forced reunification
ofthe Korean peninsula generated an unexpectedly strong response led by the United States.
The United States took action to prevent a Chinese invasion of Taiwan while the Korean
conflict raged. The United States also confronted the PRC militarily three times during the
1950s in the Taiwan Strait regarding the PRC's differences with Taiwan. Two Taiwan Strait
crises involved both implicit and explicit threats of nuclear force from the United States toward
the mainland. 121 Though the PRC backed down, intermittent shelling of Taiwanese-held
offshore islands continued through 1979, ceasing when the United States normalized relations
with the mainland. PRC rhetoric then shifted to "peaceful reunification" with Taiwan. In the
post-Cold War era, however, China's "liberation" rhetoric resurfaced and in 1996, the PRC-
Taiwan dispute again threatened to become an armed conflict.
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Historically, any external interference in Taiwanese affairs has elicited charges by the
PRC of tampering in China's internal affairs. The 1996 tensions capped a progression of
several such events. In 1992, President Bush agreed to sell 150 F- 16 fighters to Taiwan,
reversing policy against arms sales to Taiwan established by the Reagan Administration in
1982. In 1994, President Clinton, who had campaigned fervently for a tougher US posture
toward the PRC on human rights and trade practices, changed the official US protocol status
accorded to Taiwanese government representatives, allowing them to receive official state
treatment. Clinton also enabled US government representatives to receive Taiwanese officials
in US government offices, changing a policy set in 1972 by the Nixon Administration.
Taiwanese President Lee Teng-hui visited the United States in June 1995, attending his college
reunion at Cornell University. This visit particularly angered the PRC. Since 1972, no
Taiwanese head of state had received authorization to visit the United States. 122 Other
instances involved Taiwanese-French arms deals. In 1995, mounting pressure for
independence on the part oftwo influential Taiwanese political factions precipitated a reaction
from China. In response to the growing independence movement, the PRC directed
increasingly hostile rhetoric toward Taiwan. The PRC could not, in its estimate, let the
Taiwanese independence situation deteriorate further.
The Chinese found opportunities to express their dissatisfaction in the fall of 1995 and
spring of 1996. In December 1995, democratic elections for the Taiwanese national assembly
would occur. On 23 March 1996, Taiwan would be conducting a presidential election. The
latter election would be the first in which an ethnic Chinese society chose its head of state by
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secret universal franchise. It would also put current President Lee Teng-hui, a pro-Taiwanese
moderate, against the more radical pro-Taiwanese independence Democratic Progressive Party
(DPP) candidate Peng Ming-min, and Chinese appeasement candidates Lin Yang-kang and
Chen Li-an. The March 1996 presidential election essentially would be a referendum for the
Taiwanese people about dejure Taiwanese independence.
In early January 1996, former US Assistant Secretary of Defense Charles W. Freeman
Jr. learned of detailed invasion plans China had made for use against Taiwan that merely
awaited CCP approval for implementation. Although such plans are expected from any
military staff, which typically plan for a diverse range of eventualities, the admission of the
existence ofthese plans and the intentional passing of this particular information to senior US
leaders through Freeman was unusual, and amounted to a trial balloon floated by the PRC in
an attempt to gain insight into possible US resolve. 123 In conjunction with this revelation, a
December 19-20, 1995, transit of the Taiwan Strait by the USSNimitz was disclosed. This
was unusual because US warships rarely transit through the Taiwan Strait, yet such action was
not out of character. Although the US Department of Defense said the transit was due to
weather concerns, some observers speculated that the United States expressly designed this
particular transit to be a "freedom of navigation" statement as well as a demonstration ofUS
concern about mounting tensions.
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Shortly thereafter, an unexplained attack by a Chinese-flagged vessel on a Taiwan-
owned freighter occurred more than 70 kilometers off Taiwan's southern coast in the Bashi
Channel (300 kilometers off the Fujian coast). This attack escalated tensions. 124
In the summer of 1995 China conducted missile tests that continued into the fall in an
effort to influence the Taiwanese national elections in December. On 5 March 1996, Beijing
announced that it would again be conducting missile tests in the Taiwan Strait, this time during
the week preceding Taiwan's presidential election, March 8 through March 15. The tests
would involve firing suspected nuclear-capable DF-15/M-9 (CSS-6) surface-to-surface missiles
into two zones, one a mere 32 to 64 kilometers from Taiwan's Keelung Harbor. China fired
three M-9 missiles into the announced target zones shortly thereafter, one to the northeast of
Taiwan, and two to the southwest. 125
On 9 March 1996, the PRC closed a large section (6,000 square miles) of the Taiwan
Strait for conducting live fire exercises along with the missile tests. The extent of the closure
area marked the first time such a large portion of the Taiwan Strait has ever been closed.
These exercises began three days later. A fourth missile, accompanying the live fire exercises,
landed in the target area southwest of Taiwan. The live fire exercises stopped on March 25.
US reactions began with the Congress first, followed by an administration forced to
act. House Speaker Newt Gingrich issued a statement on 9 March 1996, saying, "The US








coercion that would jeopardize her security " 126 The following day the Clinton Administration
responded as well through Secretary of State Warren Christopher and National Security
Advisor Anthony Lake, who each condemned China for taking reckless action. Secretary of
Defense William Perry expressed a similar view on March ll. 127 Meanwhile, two American
aircraft carriers, the USSNimitz and USS Independence, were dispatched nearby. The USS
Independence, home-ported in Japan, arrived in a matter of days. The USS Nimitz, finishing
a deployment to the Persian Gulf, arrived a week and a half later. The dispatching of the
Nimitz to the Taiwan Strait from the Persian Gulf required "gapping" aircraft carrier coverage
of the Middle East, a rare event and a strong statement of American concern in itself.
The Taiwanese presidential election resulted in a mandate for current President Lee
Teng-hui, who received 54 percent of the vote. The second place finisher, DPP candidate
Peng Ming-min, received 21 percent. Combined, these two "Taiwan first" candidates managed
75 percent ofthe vote. The PRC's missile tests merely resulted in a shifting of votes between
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As far as the PRC's actions are concerned, no international law was violated. 129
Instead, Beijing "created the maximum sense of pressure and alarm on Taiwan without
exceeding the boundaries ofwhat a sovereign state is allowed to do." 130 It is highly unlikely
with the PRC's current economic concerns that Beijing would pursue options which would
unquestionably violate international law and consequently draw international condemnation.
Only if Taipei declared independence would Beijing risk international condemnation. 131
The PRC does not have the necessary forces to conduct an amphibious invasion of
Taiwan. The PLA may outnumber Taiwanese forces by a ratio of 10:1, but it lacks the
capacity necessary for effective power projection of this nature. China has enough landing
craft to place several thousand troops on Taiwan in a single amphibious attack, but these
landing craft would be poorly protected from aerial bombardment during the process. 132
Beyond common sense vigilance toward China, a US effort to undermine Chinese
stature (or contain it) could in the long term create greater US security problems. The
dilemma here requires assessing which type of China would be more problematic down the
road, one that is more integrated into the world community but that is also economically and
militarily more powerful, and perhaps capable of effectively projecting force onto Taiwan, or
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one that is frustrated and challenged on numerous fronts through containment actions by other
powers.
Taiwan is the most problematic territorial dispute for China. "Of all the issues of
territorial integrity, Taiwan carries the highest risk of Chinese failure." 133 After 1999, when
Macao is returned to China, Taiwan will remain the only significant territorial challenge,
compounded in its difficulty from the Chinese perspective by Western interference. "The
autonomy ofTaiwan is a thorn in the pride of China since it is both a reminder of Japan's past
aggression and a symbol ofAmerican strategic primacy in Asia." 134 Nathan and Ross contend
that, "without the American defense commitment, Taiwan's bargaining position would be more
like Hong Kong's, and Taiwan might have been integrated into the PRC long ago. This is why
Beijing considers that the heart of the Taiwan problem is not Taiwan's separation from the
mainland, but the American role in perpetuating it." 135
2. Chinese Ballistic Missile Programs
To say that China has become a global nuclear power is misleading. It has a limited
global reach capability but its arsenal. is primarily one of a regional nuclear power and its
modernization efforts reinforce this. Approximately ten percent of the missiles in China's
arsenal can be considered truly intercontinental (only the DF-5/5A). Estimates place the total
ballistic missile inventory of China at just over 100, and estimated quantities of the DF-5/5A
range from 7 to 13 missiles. All remaining missiles have ranges of 4700 km or less, allowing
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a land-based limited reach to Alaska and extreme northern Canada, or to Central Europe.
Including the possibility of using forward-deployed submarines and SLBMs, only around 15
percent of China's missile forces have the capacity to reach the United States.
China's ballistic missiles are ofuneven quality and great variance in age. It takes China
a long time to research, develop, and field a new missile system. Apparently the shortest
known developmental time frame successfully implemented is still around a decade. 136 Facing
future large demands on the limited resources, modernizing conventional forces is a higher
Chinese priority than the nuclear weapons program. 137 Yet China attaches increasing
importance to ballistic missiles for both nuclear and conventional purposes.
a. Land-Based
Currently, seven land-based ballistic missile variants are in use (Table 1), one of which,
the M-7, is not nuclear-capable. A second, the DF-15, is suspected but unconfirmed to have
a dual-use capability. Two others, the DF-3 1 and DF-41, are in development with the former
nearing deployment as a nuclear-only ICBM (China's first since the DF-5) and the latter not
expected to deploy until well after 2000 as a replacement for the DF-5. 138 Land-based ballistic
missile systems, both nuclear and non-nuclear, are the backbone of Chinese power projection
capabilities. Ballistic missiles, in the nuclear and conventional roles, are China's strongest
power projection capability, a Chinese security characteristic that is not going to change in the
foreseeable future. Its modernization drive involves three dimensions for its land-based forces.
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Table 1











DF-3/3A CSS-2 2800 IRBM N,C 50
DF-4 CSS-3 4750 IRBM N 20
DF-5/5A CSS-4 13000 ICBM N 7-13
DF-ll/M-11 CSS-7 300 SRBM N, C t
DF-15/M-9 CSS-6 600 SRBM N?,C t
DF-21/21A CSS-5 1800 MRBM N,C 36
DF-31 None 8000 ICBM N under
development
DF-41 None 12000 ICBM N under
development
M-7 CSS-8 160 SRBM C i
Sources: SIPRI Yearbooks 1994-97; Norris et. al., 358-388; 1998 Strategic Assessment.
"Missile classifications are in accordance with US Department of Defense judgements.
*Warhead classifications are (N)uclear and (C)onventional.
t Actual numbers uncertain.
First, improved missile accuracy using various methods, including the Global
Positioning System (GPS) and GLONASS, will enable better counterforce and countervalue
targeting. Such capabilities are suspected in the DF-15 missile, and are also judged to be
planned for the DF-3 1 and DF-41 . An upgrade to the DF-1 1 missile supposedly permitted a
doubling of its range after adding such accuracy improvements.
With the development of the DF-21 and its sea-based counterpart, the JL-1, China
moved from the realm ofliquid-fueled ballistic missiles into solid-fueled. Since then, the DF-
15 and DF-11 have followed suit as are the forthcoming DF-31 and DF-41. Yet solid
propellent missiles are a small fraction of China's ballistic missile inventory. Its still
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predominantly liquid-fueled force is limited in both reaction time, since it takes hours to get
ready for launch (especially the DF-5 ICBM), and in location, because the fueling equipment
ties the force to a particular location.
Mobility undergirds China's land-based missile modernization effort. Transporter-
erector-launchers (TELs) have become the platform of choice for China's land-based ballistic
missiles. TELs provide a cheap means for providing China an assured second-strike capability
by making it highly unlikely that all missile forces could be found and eliminated in a
preemptive attack by another state. China can also exploit the mobility of such missile systems
to frustrate adversary intelligence efforts and raise the level of uncertainty in the adversary.
b. Sea-Based
Currently, the PRC only has one SLBM, the JL-1, in service, with a second, the JL-2
(the sea-launched version ofthe DF-3 1), in development (Table 2). Although the JL-1 SLBM
arrived in 1982, its effective deployment as a sea-based deterrent did not happen for six more
years. The commissioning of the 09-2 SSBN occurred in 1988. This SSBN carries 12
Table 2










JL-1 CSS-N-3 1700 24 N
JL-2 CSS-NX-4 8000 under development N
Source: SIPRI Yearbooks
'Warhead classifications are (N)iiclear and (C)onventional.
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missiles.
139 Although two of these 09-2 submarines were built, only one is confirmed to be
operational. The 09-4, China's second-generation missile sub, is expected to be completed by
about the year 2000, and it will be equipped with JL-2 (the sea-launched version of the DF-3 1)
missiles with an 8,000 km range. 140
c. Exports
In the past, China has exported ballistic missiles and ballistic missile technologies.
During the late 1980s, China sold DF-3/3A missiles (without warheads) to Saudi Arabia. 141
China transferred DF-ll/M-11 missile components to Pakistan in the early 1990s, and is
suspected of technologically aiding Pakistan's indigenous missile production capability.
China's special relationship with Iran regarding missile technology has recently faltered,
however, over concerns about Iran's ability to pay for Chinese assistance and world
condemnation of China's role. It is believed that the DF-15/M-9 (CSS-6) is being marketed
for export, but as of yet, no known sales have occurred. This concern about possible M-9
sales persists despite China's 1992 commitment to abide by the MTCR.
B. THE UNITED STATES, CHINA, AND THE BMD DEBATE
The concept of anti-ballistic missile systems emerged alongside the development of the
more familiar offensive missile systems during the first half of the Cold War. Until the early
1970s, it appeared that US missile defenses would progress alongside their offensive
counterparts. The United States has a number of anti-ballistic missile programs in its history
1 9 John Wilson Lewis and Xue Litai, China 's Strategic Seapower: The Politics ofForce
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to show for this: Nike-Zeus, Nike-X, Sprint, Sentinel, Safeguard, and later the Strategic
Defense Initiative (SDI). 142 In 1972 the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty between the
United States and the Soviet Union confirmed bilateral vulnerability to nuclear attack and
curbed US research and development efforts toward active defenses. The ABM Treaty has
since limited the defensive side of the strategic equation, despite the fact that the Strategic
Defense Initiative (SDI) resurrected ideas of large-scale missile defenses in the 1980s.
In this section, the issues surrounding post-Cold War US BMD are briefly examined,
followed by an assessment of the effects on Chinese national security and potential Chinese
responses. Such an exploration of BMD is not intended to predict the future course of
Chinese national security decision-making, but instead to filter the myriad of options the
Chinese have and to determine, based on the preceding evaluation of their national security
concerns, which are more likely to be acted on.
1. US BMD Issues
a. Moral Responsibility
The proponents of acquiring ballistic missile defenses empnasize the nation's moral
obligation to provide for the safety and protection of its citizens and forward-deployed
soldiers. Opponents of BMD contend that the moral responsibility rather is to cure the
disease (defined as the existence ofnuclear weapons) rather than to treat the symptom (citizen
and soldier vulnerability). The record of the past fifty years shows that the elimination of
nuclear weapons is an extremely complicated proposition. In some circumstances, even to
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limit the spread ofnuclear weapons may be impossible. BMD proponents argue therefore that
the United States ought to do what is within its reach to mitigate the risks posed by the
unavoidable presence ofnuclear weapons in the world. Moreover, BMD proponents point out
that ballistic missiles may also have chemical, biological, or conventional warheads.
b. Theater Threat
Aside from the philosophical question surrounding the defense of forward-deployed
US troops, the operational and political ramifications are subject to debate. Coercion by a
missile-armed adversary can be either direct (directed at the United States or its forces) or
indirect (situations in which a weaker power that lacks the capability to deter a stronger power
directly might choose to threaten another weaker power, one usually but perhaps not always
allied to the United States). This threat could also be applied against a state with no real
political connection to the ongoing conflict. 143 The world saw this in the Persian Gulf in 1991
.
Iraq threatened and then attacked Israel and Saudi Arabia in an effort to ward off intervention
by the US-led coalition.
Ballistic missiles are short-time delivery vehicles that may be used by powers unable
to compete with the United States by acquiring more expensive, longer-fused air forces. The
Iraqi experience in 1991 demonstrated that a regional power's air forces probably will not
come close to matching up against the airpower ofthe United States and that conventional air
forces are not an effective avenue for engaging the United States militarily. The Iraqi success
in inflicting damage and killing and injuring US personnel with relatively cheap Scud missiles




conventional air power — that is, ballistic missiles. US BMD offers the opportunity to
significantly reduce or even eliminate the attractiveness of this asymmetric alternative.
c Hedge Against Rogue and Failing Nuclear or Nuclear-Capable States
The collapse of the Soviet Union precipitated a situation where instability and
uncertainty surrounded a state and its military possessing ballistic missiles and nuclear
weapons. Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan were the immediate inheritors of the
Soviet nuclear arsenal. Concerns about stability, economics, and command and control raised
awareness of the threat of accidental launch or the diffusion of ballistic missiles, nuclear
weapons, nuclear materials, and nuclear expertise. Although Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakstan
eventually resolved concerns by giving up control of those weapons to Russia, other states
could also pose regime failure problems, notably North Korea and Pakistan. Rogue states—
such as Libya, Iran, North Korea, Syria and Iraq — pose increasing regional threats to US
forces reacting to conflict as well as to US regional allies and neutral states. 144 And rogue
actors need not be states. The terrorist missile threat could also, at least in some instances, be
countered by BMD.
d Cost
High on the list of objections to BMD is its cost. In fiscal year 1997, US $3.6 billion
funded the BMDO, which manages all of the United States BMD research and development
efforts. Tens ofbillions of dollars have been invested in BMD programs since the mid-1980s,
with little fielded capability to show for it. Perhaps the Patriot PAC-3 is the most significant
result, and that has limited application. BMD opponents argue that both domestic needs and
Rogue states as reported by 1998 Strategic Assessment , 7.
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other US security needs should be regarded as higher priorities than BMD. It is unknown how
much investment it will take to develop the desired capabilities, assuming that all are even
possible.
Can we hit a bullet with a bullet? Questions about the feasibility of such aspirations
and the increasingly disadvantageous cost-exchange ratio have been raised as research and
development costs have mounted. At least one multimillion dollar interceptor would be used
to destroy a several hundred thousand dollar missile. Would the operational costs of such
systems be prohibitive, such that the United States would use a platinum bullet to counter a
brass one? Such asymmetrical ratios make saturation counter-strategies to BMD appealing
for US adversaries in possession of such missiles. Conversely, such ratios have encouraged
the United States to examine other methods of defeating missiles, such as directed-energy
interception means or better space-based reconnaissance to be able to destroy the missiles at
their launch sites.
e. The Time Factor
Rendering ballistic missile delivery systems ineffective could enable the United States
to defuse a crisis situation. With US BMD present, an adversary's offensive action would
require more time-consuming military operations such as conventional air power sortieing from
bases or maneuvering ground forces. This would increase detection times and also allow the
United States more time for diplomatic or military reaction. Escalation control would be better




Most of the arguments against BMD concern the damage such capabilities would
allegedly cause to the arms control and disarmament efforts of the past thirty years. The NPT,
the ABM Treaty, and the START treaties would suffer, it is argued. Such arguments assume
that continued arms control efforts can limit or even reverse the security consequences of
nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles.
While BMD does not directly undermine the NPT, it does raise questions about the US
commitment to the NPT's Article VI (nuclear disarmament). Critics ofBMD and nuclear
weapons argue that the development and possession ofBMD would perpetuate the presence
of nuclear weapons in the international security environment, because offense-defense arms
competitions would be encouraged. Some countries might, it is argued, reevaluate
commitments to a treaty (the NPT) which has codified their lack of a security tool (nuclear
weapons). Left unanswered by this argument, though, are the efforts of non-nuclear-weapon
states, such as Taiwan and Japan, to develop BMD capabilities BMD does not pose a
dilemma for all states party to the NPT, but primarily for the five NPT-recognized nuclear
powers, to the extent that they are committed to fulfilling their Article VI commitment to
nuclear disarmament. 145
The most problematic arms control conflict BMD creates concerns ABM Treaty
compliance. The ABM Treaty is the foundation of bilateral Washington-Moscow nuclear arms
145 The United States, Russia, Britain, France, and China.
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limitation treaties.
146 The arguments over the ABM Treaty aspect ofBMD have resulted in
a binary choice for the United States: either the ABM Treaty is maintained, in which case a
number ofUS BMD programs enter into question, or the United States withdraws from the
treaty. Amending the ABM Treaty is highly improbable, in view of failed efforts earlier in the
post-Cold War period. "Muddle-through" avoidance of the ABM Treaty question may result
in its defacto voiding. 147
The START treaties could be damaged by BMD through vertical proliferation
countermeasures. More ballistic missiles, MTRVed missiles, cruise missiles, and clandestine
means (smuggling) all provide means to saturate or circumvent BMD and raise the probability
of nuclear weapons employment by unauthorized use (the failed or failing state fear), and
accidental detonation or accidental launch, misperception or miscalculation in a crisis, or the
failure to adequately deter. In any ofthese cases, the magnitude of disaster could be amplified
by vertical BMD countermeasures.
g. Continuing Proliferation
Despite all of the best efforts of the arms control community, nuclear weapons,
chemical weapons, and biological weapons are proliferating. So are ballistic missile delivery
systems. The Rumsfeld Commission reports that "the threat to the [United States] posed by
these emerging capabilities is broader, more mature and evolving more rapidly than has been
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reported in estimates and reports by the Intelligence community." 148 Fueled by the US-led
coalition's demolition of Iraqi conventional air forces in 1991, states are recognizing that
questionable investments in expensive air forces which are likely to fall victim to superior US
air forces early in a conflict are unwise, and that less expensive ballistic missile systems are
better investments. Mobile ballistic missile systems proved themselves difficult to attack in
1991, demonstrating a better prospect to inflict damage on the United States. With the
emerging systems of improved accuracy, no longer are ballistic missiles limited to carrying
weapons of mass destruction to inflict substantial damage. This suggests an increasing
likelihood that the United States will encounter ballistic missiles in conflicts. Although others
argue that there are less expensive measures with which to deal with the proliferation problem,
including arms control non-proliferation measures and economic incentives, BMD supporters
insist that the inability to stop proliferation demonstrates the weaknesses of these alternatives.
2. China's Capabilities, Reactions, and Regional Reality
Despite China's irredentist claims to territories it considers its own (territories it
considers lost because ofthe machinations of other powers during its century of humiliation),
China is not a rogue state. To restore China's past stature Beijing is engaging in actions legal
by international standards. If anything, China shows a deft ability to press the limits of
international acceptability. For each reason pessimists about China's behavior tout in support
of US-led containment efforts, a reason to engage China can also be touted by optimists.
149
148 Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States. Executive summary
ofthe Report ofthe Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States, Donald H.
Rumsfeld, Chairman. 104th Congress. 15 July, 1998.
149
Ronald N. Montaperto, Reality Check: Assessing the Chinese Military Threat, Progressive
Policy Institute Defense Working Paper No. 4, Steven J. Nider, ed., April 1998, 5. Accessible from the
76
BMD, especially TMD, plays well to the Chinese containment crowd. While NMD has the
potential to take away China's extraregional nuclear deterrent, TMD portends a devastating
diminution of Chinese missile effectiveness in the Asia-Pacific region, and ultimately a
diminution of Chinese regional coercive capacity.
The United States is China s short-term security concern. China sees the potential of
BMD to allow the United States to freely operate globally as yet another way to allow the
United States to exercise its self-appointed role as the leading international policeman. The
ability of the United States to unilaterally frustrate Chinese national interests is the specific
problem, and Chinese short-term modernization efforts are directed toward overcoming this
threat. Taiwan, however, is the Chinese Communist Party 's short-term security concern
because ofthe legitimacy stake the party placed on the issue. In the face of China's growing
internal economic challenges and Taiwan's democratization and vibrant economy, the CCP
cannot "lose" Taiwan to independence. Japan is China's long-term security concern. Since
the late 1800s, Japan has been China's security frustration. The memories ofWorld War II
remain. Although the United States is a short-term problem, China recognizes that the US-
Japan security alliance is containing China's greatest fear — a militarily resurgent and
unilaterally acting Japan in the region. Japan is China's regional competitor.
Regional issues promising clashes ofinterests between the United States and China are
the future ofthe Korean peninsula and Taiwan. Anticipating the failure ofNorth Korea, China
has taken to strengthening its ties to the South during the 1990s. With the collapse of the
Soviet Union, North Korea is effectively alone. Since there is uncertainty as to how far the
Internet at http://\v\w.dlcppi.org/libraiy.html-ssi.
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North's nuclear program has progressed, the method of the North's demise (whether it
implodes, explodes, or uneventfully reunifies) is paramount. Questions ofwhose orbit a united
peninsula will ultimately choose have considerable implications for the China — Japan—
Korea— United States quadrangle. China desires to draw a unified Korean peninsula into its
orbit of influence out of concern regarding the Northeast Asian future power balance.
Complicating both Chinese and US security concerns in Northeast Asia in the longer-
term is Russia, which is far from stable. Russia's considerable nuclear and missile resources
remain in China's security calculus despite a warming cooperation in the post-Cold War.
Given the situation in relations between Pakistan and India, the tenuous stability of the regional
status quo is appealing for China— at least in comparison to open warfare. While legitimacy
is the CCP's challenge, stability is the linchpin for that legitimacy; and the ingredients of
legitimacy include territorial integrity and economic growth.
US BMD, Japanese assistance to BMD research and development, and an independent
BMD effort within the context of a democratizing and economically vibrant Taiwan raise
serious concerns for PRC national interests. 150 In the short term, the problem is largely one
of a political nature since China's existing military capabilities can overwhelm limited BMD
efforts of questionable reliability. In the longer term, assuming that near-term limited BMD
capabilities would evolve and become capable of intercepting a greater volume and variety of
missiles, with a reduction in the BMD cost-exchange ratio, China's security posture would
experience a fundamental need to adapt.
"Leaders from Taiwan's ruling Kuomingtan party tend to downplay Taipei's interest in TMD
while opposition lawmakers often are bellicose in their support for accelerated development and eventual
deployment of antimissile capabilities." Opall-Rome, 34.
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The concept of a revolution in military affairs (RMA) involves three dimensions:
technological innovation, operational integration, and organizational adaptation. Technology
or technological innovation alone does not provide an effective force. That technology must
be integrated into the fighting force structure such that the capabilities are brought to bear in
the most efficient way possible. The military must also be able to adapt the necessary
organizational structure to bring those capabilities to bear rapidly and effectively.
The PRC modernization efforts are asymmetric to those of the United States. The
PLA is the single military service, with the navy (PLAN) and the air force (PLAAF) as subject
parts. The PLA is responsible for the modernization process without substantial interference
on the part of component services. In contrast, in the United States the Army, Navy, Air
Force, and Marines each have substantial influence on the acquisition processes, to say nothing
ofthe politics involved in Congressional-Executive interactions in the US government. As a
result, China may be in a much better position to enact top-down modernization programs
incorporating unique combat concepts. Service parochialism may be a marginal, if not
irrelevant, modernization restraint.
China's current modernization efforts that encompass its missile systems are a way to
curb US unilateral action and remain able to coerce Taiwan should independence ideas
progress. Accuracy improvements could allow airburst conventional munitions to reliably
carpet Taiwanese airfields, prompting Taiwan to move to protect its aircraft at the cost of not
being able to make quick use ofthem.
The M-9 gives China the ability to exert military and political pressure within the
region. . . . Chinese military writings cast these missiles in the same light in which the
United States casts its own high-technology missiles in the Gulf War. That is, the
Chinese military would use their rocket forces in a first-strike against Taiwan airfields,
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air defenses, and command and control sites in an effort to degrade Taiwanese air and
air defense capabilities. 151
As far as nuclear arms control is concerned, China emphasizes the principle that the US
and Russian arsenals should be reduced to levels comparable with China's forces before
Beijing will engage in any arms limitations or reductions negotiations. More so than the large
arsenal ofthe Russians, US BMD would undermine the medium nuclear states' deterrents—
particularly that of China.
China is not a party to the ABM Treaty, nor has China made any commitment to abide
by its provisions as it has with the MTCR. Although public statements in support of the ABM
Treaty have been made, China shows no inclination to become a party to the treaty. Beijing
is on record, however, in opposing any effort to renegotiate the ABM treaty. The fear is that
advanced theater missile defenses would seriously undermine China's deterrent, and invalidate
much of China's existing nuclear delivery capability. According to Garrett and Glaser,
In an unpublished April 1995 paper assessing the implications of amending the ABM
Treaty, an arms control expert from a scientific research institute involved in China's
nuclear weapons program calculated that 80 percent of Chinese land-based "strategic
missiles" would fall into the category of "theater" missiles and would be vulnerable
to US and Russian TMD systems aiming at countering missiles with ranges up to
3,00' m. The analyst further contended that a TMD system capable of destroying
warh s entering the atmosphere at 5 km/sec would have significant capabilities
\ againsi China's longer-range strategic missiles.
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Furthermore, Robert Sutter notes that:
China's few dozen nuclear-capable bombers are too slow and tecnnically backward
to penetrate modem air defenses. Beijing relies for nuclear weapons delivery mainly
151
Michael Nacht and Tom Woodrow, "Nuclear Issues," in Strategic Trends in China, Hans
Binnendijk and Ronald N. Montaperto, eds. (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press,
1998), 89.
152
Garrett and Glaser, 73.
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on its mobile ground-based and nascent sea-based missiles. ... Ail of China's current
mobile missiles, land- or sea- based, would be blocked by the TMD system proposed
by US advocates. 153
In the post-Cold War period, China has slowly realized the need to curb nuclear
proliferation for its own security. This concern stems from its need for regional stability in the
face of a number of weak or failing neighboring states. Despite its accession to the NPT,
China apparently doubts whether the nonproliferation regime can do more than slow the
spread of WMD. Furthermore, China does not equate nuclear proliferation with ballistic
missile proliferation. Complicating the issue of proliferation is China's distinction between
nuclear weapons and nuclear power. The Chinese emphasize the right of developing states to
acquire nuclear power to satisfy their energy needs. China is willing to assist developing
countries in developing nuclear power capabilities. vy9
What, then, are the consequences ofUS BMD on Chinese national security? First and
foremost, China is not in a position economically or militarily to raise much more than political
objections. Asymmetric countermeasures are their probable military response. Area denial
strategies directed at forestalling US regional interference regardless of the existence ofUS
BMD capabilities are even now underway.
Lewis and Xue note that an offshore defense strategy is replacing the past coastal
defense strategy, meaning that the Chinese are pushing their defense perimeter out to between
200-nm and 400-nm. 154 Ballistic and cruise missiles are essential components, along with an
increasing realization of the submarine potential. The submarine component is much less a
Robert G. Sutter, Theater Missile Defense: Possible Chinese Reactions; US Implications
and Options, Congressional Research Service Report 94-154S, (23 February, 1994), 2.
154
Lewis and Xue, China 's Strategic Seapower, 228, 230.
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current factor in China's capabilities, and it is uncertain how fast such a capability might grow.
In 1991, the Central Military Commission ordered the navy to continue constructing
submarines and gave "the development of submarines... precedence over all other
[construction]." 155 Submarine construction efforts are moving slowly. Efforts to purchase
diesel submarines from Russia have faltered. Originally ten Kilo submarines were to be
purchased. Two have been received, but acquiring the remaining eight is in question. In any
conflict involving Taiwan, the front line of defense would nonetheless be submarines, because
China intends to inject uncertainty into the United States intervention calculus as part of an
emerging area denial strategy. 156 That is, the submarines would keep US surface ships at a
distance to facilitate the conduct of China's missile attacks.
155 Guo Xiangxing, "An Interview with Vice-Admiral Zhang Lianzhong, Commander of the
Chinese Navy," Xiandai Junshi, No. 7, 1991; cited in Lewis and Xue, China 's Strategic Seapower, 228.
156
Lewis and Xue, China 's Strategic Seapower, 228.
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V. CONCLUSION
The highest realization ofwarfare is to attack the enemy's plans; next is to attack their
alliances; next to attack their army; and the lowest is to attack their fortified cities.
Sim Tzu, The Art ofWar
China is already addressing future US BMD capabilities while shaping its national
security strategies for the next century. Beijing aims to curb US influence through area denial
strategies. Beijing plans to combine missiles and blue water naval power forces to inject
uncertainty into US intervention calculations. US ballistic missile defenses would challenge
China's area denial strategy by potentially negating China's short and medium range ballistic
missiles. The implications ofUS BMD for China's nuclear deterrent are secondary to those
US BMD would have for Chinese conventional power projection abilities.
Because ofthis area denial consequence, US BMD programs constitute an important
factor in Chinese national security strategy and planning. Relatively simple technical
countermeasures could hypothetically be implemented to thwart US BMD, albeit at a resource
expense that China would prefer to avoid, owing to its other priorities. Depending in part on
the level ofUS investment and potential technological achievements, US BMD ultimately may
be oflimited consequence to China's military capabilities, and in the longer term, may prove
to be insufficient to negate China's ballistic missile threat, wherever that threat might be
directed. It will take time for US BMD research and development efforts to field systems that
can effectively counter China's existing missiles. But when US ballistic missile defenses are
fielded years from now, a myriad ofcountermeasures will have been developed by the Chinese
and may undermine that BMD capability. China can immediately pursue the simplest
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countermeasure to BMD— vertical escalation (that is, multiplying numbers of missiles and
warheads)— to overwhelm and therefore penetrate any ballistic missile defense systems based
on kinetic-kill interceptor missiles. Future measures, such as MIRVs, maneuverable reentry
vehicles (MARVs), depressed missile trajectories (to defeat upper-tier systems), and cruise
missiles would increase the challenges facing US missile defense programs. Area denial
strategies using submarine threats to keep US naval BMD assets at a distance and thereby
preclude BMD engagement also could pose problems for the United States.
Cost-exchange ratios will be of decisive importance. If it costs a ballistic missile
defense system several millions of dollars to intercept ballistic missiles costing several hundred
thousand to two million dollars, the United States will find itself on the wrong side of the
expense equation, especially if the Chinese pursue saturation tactics.
If it was obviously easy to defeat US missile defenses, however, the Chinese would not
be concerned about them. The Chinese may well be concerned about increased costs, about
the political implications of being obliged to undertake larger missile attacks, and about the
possibility that the United States may develop missile defenses based on directed energy
systems and enhanced space-based reconnaissance and early warning that would shift the cost-
exchange ratio decisively against China.
It is not apparent that China wants conflict with the United States. It is in US interests
to reassure Chinese leaders, both politically and militarily, particularly on the bilateral level.
The Chinese are seeking the ability to counter what they consider unchecked US regional
power. At least for the time being, however, the Chinese do not want the United States to
remove its political-military presence from the region. A reduced US political-military
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presence would invite Japan to build up its military, a greater long-term concern for Chinese
national interests than US influence in the region. China's interest in maintaining constructive
economic and political relations with the United States offers the United States an opportunity
to pursue its decisions about missile defenses in East Asia in a cautious and deliberate manner,
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